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 chapter 1 A missed opportunity
At the time of publication (September 2017), the last 
two years appear as having been something of an 
uncertain period for youth justice. In September 2015, 
Michael Gove, then Justice Secretary, announced that 
Charlie Taylor, former Chief Executive of the National 
College of Teaching and Leadership, would lead a 
‘Departmental review’ of the youth justice system.1 
The terms of reference were wide-ranging requiring 
consideration of: 
• ‘The nature and characteristics of offending by 
young people aged 10-17 and the arrangements in 
place to prevent it; 
• ‘How effectively the youth justice system and its 
partners operate in responding to offending by 
children and young people, preventing further 
offending, protecting the public and repairing harm 
to victims and communities, and rehabilitating 
young offenders; 
 and 
• ‘Whether the leadership, governance, delivery 
structures and performance management of the 
youth justice system is effective in preventing 
offending and reoffending, and in achieving value 
for money’. 
Disappointingly, and without any rationale being 
provided, the age of criminal responsibility, the 
treatment of children in courts and the sentencing 
framework were explicitly excluded from the review, 
but it was nonetheless clear that the exercise had the 
potential to herald significant change in arrangements 
for dealing with children in conflict with the law.2 
Moreover, following the publication by Charlie Taylor 
of an interim report in February 2016, which dealt 
largely with the state of custodial provision for children, 
the Justice Secretary confirmed that he had amended 
the terms of reference to include examination of 
‘the way young offenders are dealt with in court, and 
the sentences available to tackle their offending’.3 
(Predictably perhaps, the age at which children are held 
to be criminally responsible remained outside the remit 
of the review, despite repeated criticisms from within 
the jurisdiction and without.4)
It was anticipated that the review would report in the 
summer of 2016 and, as a consequence, developments 
in youth justice both nationally and at a local level were 
effectively put on hold. This was particularly so because 
it was widely anticipated that any recommendations 
made by Taylor would have government endorsement. 
In the event, publication was delayed following 
ministerial changes in the aftermath of the referendum 
on membership of the European Union. The report 
eventually appeared in December 2016, but it no 
longer had the status of a Departmental review; 
government endorsement was no longer assured and 
the report was published alongside a government 
response.5 While the Taylor review was wide-ranging 
and, in some respects, quite radical, a number of key 
recommendations were rejected or ignored by the 
government and commitments to reform were for the 
most part couched in vague terms or put off for future 
consideration.6  For example, Taylor details a range of 
principles and assumptions which he considers should 
inform arrangements for dealing with children in 
conflict with the law. These include:
• A focus on the child first and the offender second;
• Children who break the law should be treated 
differently from adults;
• Because many of the causes of youth offending 
lie beyond the reach of the youth justice system; 
a broad range of agencies should provide an 
integrated response to preventing and addressing 
offending behaviour;
• Education should be at the heart of that response;
• Contact with the criminal justice system tends to 
increase the likelihood of offending and children 
should be diverted from it wherever possible; 
• More persistent and serious offending often implies 
that the children concerned are deeply troubled, 
and responses to such offending should recognise 
that fact.  
By contrast, the government, in the first line of its 
response, makes reference to the youth justice system’s 
central role in ‘punishing crime’ and later reiterates that 
the statutory aim of the system is to prevent offending 
and reoffending by children and young people. 
Taylor calls for a clear division between the role of 
the court in establishing guilt where an offence is 
denied and deciding what action ‘should be taken 
to repair harm and rehabilitate the child’ once 
responsibility for the offending has been determined. 
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His report proposes that the latter process should be 
transformed through the creation of Children’s Panels 
whose purpose would be to develop, and oversee 
until completion, a plan to address the causes of the 
child’s behaviour, including ‘any health, welfare and 
education issues’. The government’s response, while 
claiming to support the principles that inform Taylor’s 
recommendation, commits itself merely to consider 
how these might be integrated within the current 
statutory framework. In the view of the National 
Association for Youth Justice (NAYJ), this failure to 
address much of the substance of the Taylor review 
represents a missed opportunity.  
The government’s response to Taylor’s proposals on 
youth custody is potentially more sympathetic. Building 
on the interim report, his final report maintains that 
the existing secure estate for children is in need 
of ‘fundamental reform’ and that young offender 
institutions (YOIs) and secure training centres (STCs) 
should be replaced by a network of ‘secure schools’. 
The government has confirmed that two such schools 
are to be piloted, although little information is currently 
available as to what these might look like or on a likely 
timescale for the pilots.7 In the intervening period, 
responsibility for commissioning children’s custodial 
provision has been removed from the Youth Justice 
Board (YJB) and transferred to a newly established 
Youth Custody Service which is to function ‘as a distinct 
arm of HM Prison and Probation Service’.8 Charlie 
Taylor, who in his review recommended the abolition of 
the YJB, has been appointed as the Board’s chair.  
It is fair to say, then, that the future of youth justice 
has recently been clouded by a lack of clarity, which 
in turn has tended to inhibit innovation and allow a 
further diminution of resources.  Meanwhile, the past 
two years have seen a continuation of the predominant 
trends that have characterised youth crime and 
responses to it for much of the past decade. Perhaps 
most notably, there has been a sharp fall in the number 
of children receiving a formal youth justice disposal 
every year between 2008 and 2016. Much of this 
decline can be seen as a function of a decrease in the 
number of children entering the system for the first 
time – so called first time entrants (FTEs).9 Whatever 
the reason for the contraction (and some suggestions 
are offered in due course), the size of the youth justice 
system is significantly reduced by comparison with a 
decade ago. Over the same period, there has been an 
equally dramatic decline in the use of imprisonment for 
children, generating a corresponding slimming-down in 
the population of the secure estate for children.  The 
NAYJ has previously posited a relationship between 
these two trends.10
This ‘shrinkage’ in youth justice is without doubt the 
most significant headline from any analysis of recent 
trend data. It is important to recognise, however, that 
such statistical indicators do not necessarily reflect, in 
any linear fashion, changes in the volume of children’s 
criminal activity. Rather, responses to such behaviour 
are mediated through shifts in legislation, policy and 
practice which determine to a significant degree which 
children - and how many of them - are processed 
through formal youth justice mechanisms. Nor should 
it be assumed that changes in policy and practice 
constitute evidence-led responses to the nature and 
extent of children’s law breaking; indeed, they may 
more commonly be explained as a function of political 
or financial expediency.11     
The NAYJ campaigns for a ‘child-friendly’ youth justice 
system and advocates the establishment of a rights-
based statutory framework for children in conflict 
with the law.12 From such a perspective, the trends 
described above are to be welcomed: they represent a 
clear manifestation of increased diversion from formal 
criminal justice responses and a reduced reliance 
on child incarceration; developments that are, it is 
increasingly accepted, consistent with the evidence 
base.13 At the same time, given the caveats outlined 
above, the NAYJ considers that a proper understanding 
of those developments also necessitates an analysis 
of the context in which the contraction of the youth 
justice system has taken place in order to evaluate the 
extent to which the delivery of services to children 
in trouble is tending in a more (or less) child-friendly 
direction and whether policy shifts associated with 
a declining youth justice population are determined 
primarily by a commitment to an evidence-informed, 
principled, values base or by pragmatic and political 
considerations. Such an analysis will also inform an 
assessment of how embedded, or alternatively fragile 
and potentially subject to rapid reversal, recent gains 
might be. This is a particular concern given that the 
latest available figures at the time of writing, for June 
2017, suggest that after eight years of consistent 
decline in the child custodial population, the use of 
imprisonment may have started to rise again, an issue 
considered in more detail in due course.14
For example, while the patterns shown in the data 
demonstrate that children are increasingly diverted 
from formal sanctions and that child custody is used 
more sparingly than hitherto, the NAYJ remains 
concerned that responses to children in trouble with 
The NAYJ campaigns for a ‘child-friendly’ youth 
justice system and advocates the establishment 
of a rights-based statutory framework for 
children in conflict with the law.
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the law continue to be tempered by an underlying 
punitive ethos, as manifested for example by the 
introduction, in 2015, of mandatory custodial sentences 
for 16 and 17 year olds convicted for a second time of 
possession of a knife or offensive weapon.15 There is 
evidence too that system-contraction might be driven 
at least in part by financial imperatives, associated 
with a perceived need for austerity, rather than by any 
considered judgement of how the wellbeing of children 
in conflict with the law might best be promoted.16 As 
a consequence, savings accrued in the youth justice 
sector – funding to youth offending teams fell by 
more than a quarter between 2011 and 201617 - are 
lost to children rather than reallocated to mainstream 
children’s or alternative forms of youth provision. Given 
the government’s response to the Taylor review, it 
would be overly optimistic to expect that any increased 
resources to support children who might be at risk of 
criminalisation or victimisation will be forthcoming in 
the coming period. The capacity of the voluntary sector 
to pick up the slack is, moreover, severely constrained 
and is, in any event, increasingly tied up in partnerships 
with private providers and payment-by-results (PbR) 
contracting. 
Clearly, youth justice cannot be understood in isolation 
from other policies and services that impact on the 
same children. Indeed Charlie Taylor has made a 
persuasive case that responses to children in trouble 
with the law should be better-aligned with other 
children’s services. Although such considerations are 
largely beyond the scope of the current paper, it may 
be that the logic of austerity actually helps to explain 
an increased tolerance for children in trouble but at the 
same time dictates that wider policy developments are 
less compatible with children’s wellbeing. For instance, 
the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, in its latest assessment of the UK’s compliance 
with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
published in June 2016, registered serious concern… 
‘at the effects that recent fiscal policies and 
allocation of resources have had in contributing 
to inequality in children’s enjoyment of their 
rights, disproportionately affecting children in 
disadvantaged situations…. [B]udgetary lines for 
children in disadvantaged or vulnerable situations 
… may require affirmative social measures 
and [the state should] make sure that those 
budgetary lines are protected even in situations 
of economic recessions.’18
The failure to support and adequately-resource 
mainstream provision for children runs the risk that 
a withdrawal of youth justice interventions, although 
well-intentioned and in accord with the evidence base, 
might at the same time constitute a form of what 
Stanley Cohen referred to as ‘benign neglect’. Given the 
relationship between crime and the economy, it should 
be added that the consequences of failure to attend 
to such concerns might include a longer term negative 
impact on levels of youth offending.19 
Purpose of the report
This report provides an overview of what is known 
about the nature and prevalence of youth crime in 
England and Wales, drawing on the latest available 
data. It aims to offer a contextual analysis of trends 
suggested by the figures that facilitates an assessment 
of the treatment of children who come to the attention 
of the youth justice system, considering the extent to 
which responses take adequate account of children’s 
rights and best interests.20  It deals with the following 
areas:
• The extent of youth crime shown in the statistical 
data and how those statistics might most usefully be 
understood;
• The nature of youthful offending and the 
characteristics of children who come to the 
attention of the youth justice system;
• The policing of children and the development of 
alternatives to arrest; 
• The use of formal pre-court measures;
• Principles of sentencing and court community 
disposals;
• The use of custody for children and the treatment of 
children deprived of their liberty;
• The extent of reoffending following youth justice 
intervention and whether recidivism data provide a 
reliable indicator of effectiveness.  
The paper focuses on children aged 10-17 years, 
reflecting the minimum age of criminal responsibility in 
England and Wales and the age at which young people 
are considered adults for criminal justice purposes.21 
Trends are for most purposes traced from 1992 
onwards because of difficulties of comparison with the 
earlier period.22 
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As indicated in the previous section, official statistics 
register a pronounced fall in the number of children 
coming to the attention of the youth justice system 
in the recent period. According to YJB figures, the 
number of proven offences committed by children 
between 2007 and 2016 declined by 73%. However, 
assessing the extent of offending is not like measuring 
the volume of a material object since crime is a 
‘social construct’ determined by the current state of 
legislative prohibition rather than the nature of the 
behaviour itself.1  For instance, the banning of what 
were called ‘legal highs’ in 2016 increased the range of 
behaviours that could contravene the criminal law. 2 As 
a consequence what constitutes a crime at one time 
may not be considered so at another and vice versa. 
What is perhaps more important from the current 
perspective, however, is that figures for detected 
youth crime are by no means a direct reflection of 
the underlying level of childhood criminal activity 
since they only capture those matters which receive 
a formal sanction. Children may escape apprehension 
or their behaviour may not attract a response that 
results in a criminal record. There are other measures 
that provide information in relation to youth crime 
but, as discussed in the following sections of the 
report, each also has its (well known) limitations. As 
a consequence, there are considerable difficulties in 
ascertaining the extent of children’s lawbreaking and 
any estimates are of necessity inferential.3 It follows 
that further investigation would be  required before we 
could conclude that the decline in detected offending 
demonstrates that youth crime has also fallen, or fallen 
to the same extent, as suggested by official statistics. 
The crime survey, police statistics 
and their limitations
The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) 
(known as the British Crime Survey until April 20124) 
is a large scale self-report study that asks respondents 
about their experiences as victims of crime during the 
previous 12 months.5 It was first conducted in 1982 
and until 2001 results were published at two yearly 
intervals; from the latter date the survey became 
‘continuous’ with results published annually in the first 
instance6 and more recently quarterly. 
The CSEW has notable exclusions. Historically it has 
reported on respondents’ experience of personal crime 
and offences against the household of which they 
are part - although some more serious incidents, in 
particular homicide and sexual victimisation, are not 
included.7 Accordingly, it has not traditionally provided 
information on white collar offending or cyber-crime. 
Until 2012, commercial victimisation was not included 
either but this omission has been rectified by the 
introduction of a survey of businesses. Since October 
2015, new questions on fraud and computer-misuse 
offences have been added but estimates derived from 
these are currently regarded as ‘experimental’ and 
have yet to be included in the headline figures.8 In any 
event, while these appear to be areas in which crime 
is growing, it seems intuitively likely that children’s 
participation in these activities is lower than that of 
adults. Other offences are not captured by the survey: 
those which have no direct or explicit victim (such as 
possession of, or supplying, drugs) are not included; 
and persons living in institutions or other forms of non-
household accommodation are not surveyed.
As described later in the paper, the victims of much 
youth crime are themselves children. Significantly, until 
2009, individuals below the age of 16 years were also 
excluded from the survey. Since that date estimates of 
crime against those aged 10 – 15 years have been made 
but, because of difficulties of comparability as a result 
of different questions being asked, these continue to be 
reported on separately.   
Despite these limitations, the CSEW is regarded as 
a good indicator of personal and household crime 
because the number of respondents is sufficiently 
large – around 50,000 households in 2015-20169 - to 
ensure that the experiences of victimisation elicited 
in the interviews can be considered representative of 
the wider population. One of the main advantages is 
that, as a measure of victimisation, the survey identifies 
incidents that are not reported to the police – a 
considerable proportion of the total. Moreover, since 
it does not rely on police recording, the data are not 
influenced by changes in recording practice.10 
The CSEW indicates that 6.1 million offences (excluding 
fraud and cyber-offences) were committed against 
 chapter 2  How much youth crime is there  
  and how would we know?
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consistent with a reduction in youth crime since 
there are no obvious grounds for thinking that adult 
offending has declined disproportionately. While 
there is evidence that children and adults may have 
differential involvement in different offence types – 
children are over-represented among those committing 
robbery offences, for instance, but under-represented 
for crimes of fraud12 - the consistent reduction across 
a wider range of different forms of victimisation is 
suggestive of falls in offending by both children and 
adults – at least in relation to those crimes covered by 
the survey.  
The decline in the number of offences committed against 
10-15 year-olds might be thought to provide additional 
support to that interpretation of the figures since:
• children in this age range are more susceptible to 
being victims of personal crime than adults;
• young people tend to commit offences against 
others close to their own age;13 and 
• there is a significant overlap between victimisation 
and perpetration among children.14 
Falling youth victimisation might therefore be 
considered a strong indicator of declining youth 
offending.
Police recorded crime generates a markedly different 
picture; most obviously it indicates a much lower 
volume of offending than the CSEW. In the year ending 
December 2016, 4.8 million offences (including fraud) 
were recorded by the police, almost one quarter 
lower than the estimate provided by the victimisation 
survey in spite of the fact that the range of offences 
covered in the former is much broader (see below). 
The considerable gap between the two indicators is 
largely explained by a significant shortfall in reporting 
by victims for a range of reasons.15 HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary has also drawn attention to the failure 
of police adequately to record offending when it is 
reported to them: in 2014 19% of the crimes that 
victims reported were not formally recorded.16 Because 
the measure depends on police input, the results it 
persons aged 16 or older in the year ending December 
2016. This represents a 5% reduction from 6.4 million in 
the previous 12 month period. The fall is not, however, 
statistically significant other than for offences of theft. 
Over the longer period, the extent of the decline is 
much clearer: estimates of the current volume of 
crime are substantially below that in 1981 when the 
survey was first instigated. The number of offences as 
measured by the survey rose throughout the 1980s 
and the first half of the following decade, peaking in 
1995 at 19.1 million. Since that high point, the overall 
volume of crime has fallen by more than two thirds. 
There has also been a significant decline in the rate of 
victimisation: in 1995, 40 adults in every 100 reported 
being the victim of a crime; the equivalent figure in 
2016 was 14 in every 100.  While the pattern has 
varied for different types of criminal behaviour, all of 
the offences measured by the survey have registered a 
decline over this period.11 
As indicated above, the CSEW has only recently 
collected data on the criminal victimisation of children 
below the age of 16 years and these continue to be 
presented separately from information on older victims 
for methodological reasons. In addition, the survey 
questions changed during the first three years, so some 
caution is required when considering trends. There has 
been some fluctuation over the period captured by the 
data and a marked rise in the most recent 12 month 
period of 17.6%, which is a potential source of concern. 
Nonetheless, as a whole, early indications might be 
thought to suggest that child victimisation is also falling 
in line with the adult experience, albeit more slowly: 
the number of crimes experienced by children aged 10-
15 years fell by more than one fifth between 2010 and 
2016, as indicated in table 1.
A significant limitation of the CSEW from the 
perspective of the current discussion is that, because 
it focuses on the experiences of victims, it provides 
no information on perpetrators. As a consequence, it 
is not possible to determine what proportion of the 
total volume of offences can be attributed to children. 
Nonetheless, the falls in victimisation recorded are 
Year ending Number of 
offences (000s)
Difference over  
previous year
March 2010 1,056
March 2011 918 -13.1%
March 2012 1,066 16.1%
March 2013 817 -23.4%
March 2014 797 -2.5%
March 2015 718 -9.9%
March 2016 844 17.6%
Table 1 
CSEW : Offences reported by children 
aged 10 to 15 years: 2010-2016
Source:  Office for National Statistics (2017) Crime 
in England and Wales: year ending December 2016. 
London: ONS. Data are drawn from Appendix Tables. 
The figures provided here are from the ‘preferred 
measure’ which omits some ‘low level incidents between 
children’. However, the trends in the ‘broader measure’ 
of children’s victimisation is in the same direction, 
with the estimated fall between 2010 and 2016 being 
considerably higher at 39%
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have been falling since at least the mid-1990s. Further 
confirmation of that trend is provided by figures for 
incidents of anti-social behaviour (ASB) recorded by the 
police which show a decline from 3.9 million in 2007/08 
to 1.8 million in 2016.20 It is widely accepted that ASB 
is a ‘contested concept’ which depends on subjective 
perceptions of what constitutes ‘alarm, harassment 
and distress’21 and some of the decline might derive 
from a reduced saliency of ASB in policy discourse. 
There has also been a 30% reduction in the number 
of police community support officers, part of whose 
remit was to respond to, and record, ASB.22 The quality 
of police recording in this area has varied considerably 
from one force to another in any event.23 Nonetheless, 
the downward trajectory which the figures show 
reinforces, and is consistent with, other evidence 
indicating a reduction in unlawful and other forms of 
problematic behaviour. While the figures are again not 
specific to young people, children are perceived to be 
disproportionately engaged in anti-social behaviour, a 
perception that it is reflected in a higher use of anti-
social behaviour sanctions for under-18s.24  
The kids are alright – falls in 
detected youth crime 
As previously indicated, it is not possible to infer the 
extent and direction of youth crime directly from 
the data presented in the previous section of the 
paper since none of the sources described provides 
information on the individuals responsible for the 
offending reported-on. More specifically the age of a 
perpetrator can only be ascertained where he or she 
is apprehended; as a consequence, most commentary 
on trends in youth crime has tended to rely on data 
for offences that have been detected and where there 
is a recorded sanction against a particular individual. 
Trends derived from these figures are consistent with 
other measures in suggesting that there has been a 
substantial reduction in youth offending. 
It is difficult to track changes over time because of 
modifications in the way that data are recorded and 
aggregated. This qualification notwithstanding, the 
available evidence indicates that the fall in detected 
youth crime has been sustained over a considerable 
period. As noted previously, figures for detected youth 
crime prior to 1992 do not include 17 year-olds since 
children of that age were considered to be adults for 
criminal justice purposes. Earlier data are accordingly 
not comparable with information on children’s criminal 
activity after that date. This difficulty aside, between 
1980 and 1999 the number of children cautioned or 
convicted of an indictable offence fell by 37% from 
175,700 to 110,800.25 There was an inevitable sharp 
generates can also be influenced by shifts in recording 
practice or policing more generally (an issue discussed 
in more detail below). 
On the other hand, crime recorded by the police is not 
restricted to personal victimisation and it therefore 
provides data for a broader range of offending than the 
CSEW. To give a more complete picture, in recent years, 
the results from both measures have been published 
alongside each other (although it should be noted 
that because of concerns in relation to the quality of 
police recorded data, they are no longer designated 
as National Statistics). Since it is not possible to 
establish the age of a perpetrator unless he or she is 
apprehended, police recorded crime shares with the 
crime survey an inability to provide data on youth crime 
directly. 
Despite their differences of emphasis, and magnitude, 
both measures suggest a similar trajectory in terms of 
crime trends, indicating a long term decline. Figures 
for police recorded crime show that offending peaked 
somewhat earlier, in 1992 as opposed to 1995, from 
which point there were annual falls until 1998/1999. 
Changes in counting rules in the following year, and 
the introduction of the National Crime Recording 
Standard in April 2002, were reflected in an increase 
in the number of incidents recorded by the police up 
to 2003/04: the Office for National Statistics attributes 
those rises to more stringent recording practice as 
a consequence of the revised guidelines.17 More 
recently, following the bedding-in of these changes, the 
downward trend has continued with police recorded 
crime falling from 6 million offences in 2003/04 to 4.8 
million in 2016, a reduction of one fifth.18 There has 
been a corresponding decline in the rate of offences per 
1,000 in the general population from 114 in the former 
year to 83 in 2016. It should be acknowledged that 
police recorded crime has registered increases since 
2013/14, including a 9% rise in the latest year. However 
this is likely to be, at least in part, a reflection of: 
‘the renewed focus on the quality of crime 
recording by the police. This follows inspections 
of forces by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC), the Public Administration 
Select Committee (PASC) inquiry into crime 
statistics and the UK Statistics Authority’s 
decision to remove the National Statistics 
designation from police recorded crime statistics 
in 2014. This renewed focus is thought to have 
led to improved compliance with the National 
Crime Recording Standard (NCRS), leading to 
a greater proportion of reported crimes being 
recorded by the police.’19
In combination, the two primary indicators of the total 
volume of crime suggest that overall levels of offending 
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significant proportion of those who are do not receive a 
formal sanction. 
Nonetheless, such difficulties do not in themselves 
provide grounds for dismissing the pattern shown 
in figure 1, since there is no reason to suppose that 
offences committed by young people are less likely to 
be reported and detected than those perpetrated by 
adults. Indeed, given that children tend to engage in 
relatively unsophisticated criminal activity, in public 
spaces, rendering their offending more visible to the 
authorities, the reverse may be true.28 
At the same time, variations in the level of detection 
can influence the extent of youth crime that receives 
a substantive outcome and ‘clear up’ rates do vary 
over time. The rate of detection fell during the early 
part of the 1990s and this might explain some of the 
reduction in children’s recorded offending in that 
period. Between 1993 and 1999, however, there was 
an upturn in the proportion of offences reported to the 
police that were detected, so improved policing could 
not have contributed to the continued downward 
trend in recorded youth crime in those years. From 
2002/03 to 2013/14, the proportion of offences 
cleared up by the police rose again, from 23.1% to 
29.4%.29 One might accordingly have anticipated an 
increase in detected youth offending over that period; 
in the event, it fell by almost three quarters. As a 
consequence of the introduction of a new outcomes 
framework in the intervening years, more recent 
figures for police clear ups are not directly comparable. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that trends in youth crime 
cannot be explained simply as a function of changes in 
increase in detected youth crime in 1992 as 17 year-
olds were captured for the first time but thereafter, 
as shown in figure 1, there was a continued steady 
decline of 27% up to 2003.  Following a short period 
when detected offending rose, the long term decline 
recommenced from 2007 onwards. During 2016, 
21,372 children received a substantive disposal for an 
indictable offence compared with 143,600 in 1992, a 
reduction of 85%.
Figures for detected offending inevitably understate 
the extent of children’s lawbreaking for a number 
of reasons. There is a process of ‘attrition’ whereby 
offences committed by children are progressively 
filtered before reaching the stage where they are 
caught in the data for detected crime. 
First, a considerable proportion of criminal activity 
does not come to police attention. This is particularly 
true of crimes where there is no personal victim. These 
often go unnoticed. But, as noted above, even where 
victims are aware of having been offended against, 
many – accounting for 62% of offences captured by 
the British Crime Survey in 2010 - do not notify the 
police.26 
Second, where offences are reported, detection 
rates remain low: in the year ending March 2016, for 
instance, 48% of incidents recorded by the police were 
closed without any suspect being identified; in a further 
13% of cases, proceedings were not pursued because 
the victim did not support such a course.27 The effect 
of such filtering is that figures for detected youth crime 
fail to capture much of children’s criminal activity; 
most children who offend are simply not caught and a 
Figure 1



























































Figures derived from the relevant editions of Criminal Statistics England and Wales to 2009 and the renamed (and 
modified) series Criminal Justice Statistics, England and Wales to 2016
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consistency in the available data: no regular surveys 
have been conducted over the longer term; self-report 
studies that did exist have been abandoned more 
recently; and methodologies for surveys that have been 
conducted vary considerably. 
The Offender, Crime and Justice Survey was conducted 
annually by the Home Office between 2003 and 2006 
but was subsequently discontinued. It was not focused 
purely on youth crime but had a sample range of 10 to 
25 years. A longitudinal analysis of the results over the 
three years indicated a reduction in the prevalence of 
various forms of criminal activity: for instance, 17-18 
year olds born between 1986 and 1988 reported lower 
levels of engagement in assault leading to injury than 
those born in 1983-1985. Similar analysis indicates 
that, at age 12-13 years, self-reported anti-social 
behaviour for children born between 1992 and 1996 
was significantly below that for the equivalent cohort 
born in 1989-1991.30 
The Youth Justice Board commissioned MORI to 
undertake a self-report study of children aged 11-16 
years in mainstream school and pupil referral units 
annually between 2000 and 2009, although no surveys 
were conducted in 2006 or 2007. The results show 
something of a different pattern to that suggested by 
other measures. They demonstrate that while offending 
by these two groups did fall over the relevant period, 
there was some fluctuation; moreover the decline 
was more modest than that shown in other sources. 
As indicated in figure 2, the proportion of children in 
alternative education who reported having committed 
any form of offence in the previous 12 months 
the proportion of offences detected by the police. 
It might be concluded with some confidence therefore 
that, while figures for detected youth crime do not 
provide an accurate picture of the extent of children’s 
offending, they provide a useful indication of broad 
trends, including whether youth crime is increasing or 
declining. Considered in the context of the data derived 
from CSEW and police recorded crime, both of which 
show declines in the overall volume of offending, one 
might reasonably conclude that the trajectory shown 
in the figures for detected youth crime represents a 
genuine reduction in children’s law breaking. 
Confessions - self-reported 
offending
A further indicator of youth crime can be derived from 
self-report studies. Like victimisation surveys, these 
have the advantage that they are not dependent on 
offences being notified to the police or detected by 
them. Moreover, because they focus on offending 
rather than victimisation, they provide information 
on the age of the individual perpetrator, thus allowing 
a distinction between youth and adult crime. On the 
other hand, they rely on respondents giving an accurate 
account: young people may seek to exaggerate or 
minimise their engagement in delinquent activity and 
there is no definitive way of determining the extent to 
which such misrepresentations might distort the figures 
or in which direction. 
A more significant limitation, however, is a lack of 
Figure 2
Proportion of children aged 11-16 self-reporting offending in the 
previous 12 months: 2000-2009 (2006 and 2007 excepted)
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registered a fall from 72% in 2000 to 64% in 2009; the 
equivalent figures for those in mainstream schooling 
were 22% and 18% respectively.31  
One possible explanation for the apparent discrepancy 
between the MORI survey and other measures, in 
addition to the potential unreliability of children’s 
reporting, is a limitation in methodology. A focus on 
children in educational settings is liable to miss those 
at the highest risk of becoming involved in delinquent 
behaviour, since research confirms that offending is 
more prevalent among children not in any form of 
education.32 Similarly, a failure to include children 
above school leaving age – 16 years at the time of the 
survey – means that the peak age of youth offending 
is not captured.33 As a consequence, the results of the 
MORI exercise do not include information from those 
groups of children among whom rises or reductions in 
offending would be most pronounced.
The available self-report data is accordingly consistent 
with falls in the underlying level of youth offending 
over the periods to which they relate, albeit at a level 
which is more muted than given by other sources. Since 
2009, no further national self-report studies have been 
undertaken. 
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 chapter 3  Making sense of patterns of   
detected youth crime
A long-term trend with recent 
fluctuations
Given the contextual supporting evidence from an 
array of different sources, the conclusion that the long 
term trajectory registered in the data for detected 
youth crime represents a genuine decline in the 
underlying level of criminal activity by children over 
at least the last thirty or so years appears irresistible. 
This assumption is rendered even more credible when 
considered in the context of evidence that other 
problematic behaviour by children has also fallen. For 
example, after rises in the 1960s and1970s, alcohol 
consumption by young people has contracted since the 
late 1980s.1 According to the Health and Social Care 
Information Service, 38% of children aged 11-15 years 
reported ever having had an alcoholic drink in 2014 
compared to 62% in 1988 when the survey was first 
conducted. The proportion of children in that age range 
who thought it was acceptable to drink alcohol once a 
week fell over the same period from 46 to 24%.2 Trends 
for the use of illegal substances by young people have 
mirrored those for alcohol, albeit that the rise came a 
little later and the decline commenced more recently.3 
During 2014, 15% of secondary school pupils said they 
had ever taken an illegal drug compared with 29% in 
2001.4 If there have been reductions in the prevalence 
of these analogous forms of behaviour, it would not be 
unreasonable to surmise that lawbreaking would also 
be tending in the same direction, particularly as the 
links between drug taking and alcohol consumption and 
offending are well documented.5
If such conclusions as to the direction of youth 
offending run counter to general perceptions and 
media representations of children’s lawbreaking, that 
is largely a consequence of a consistent tendency on 
the part the public to estimate continued rises in the 
volume of crime since 1995 in spite of incontrovertible 
evidence to the contrary (with the possible exception in 
the more recent period of cybercrime).6
However, if the overall trajectory is plain, the pattern 
shown in figure 1 on page 10 for more recent years 
may require a more nuanced analysis. Since 2003, two 
features are particularly striking:  
• The relatively stable downward trend that had 
persisted for more than a decade came to an abrupt 
end in 2003 with a pronounced, albeit short-lived, 
rise in detected offending. By 2007, the number 
of substantive youth justice disposals imposed on 
children was one fifth higher than it had been four 
years previously.
• Conversely, the period from 2008 onwards has 
been characterised by a further sharp reversal. But 
the decline associated with this shift his has been 
significantly more pronounced than at any point 
since at least the early 1990s. Indeed, the fall during 
2008 alone was steep enough to compensate for 
the cumulative increase over the previous four 
years. The rate of decrease has scarcely abated in 
the ensuing period although there are signs of a 
slight levelling-off in the past two years: detected 
youth offending has reduced by 83% since the 
highpoint in 2007. 
These abrupt oscillations require some attention 
since it is intuitively implausible that fluctuations 
of such magnitude can be explained by changes in 
children’s offending behaviour; young people, as a 
whole population, simply don’t change that quickly. 
Significantly none of the other measures of offending 
reviewed above suggest that an abrupt short term rise 
in crime occurred in the four years from 2003. Equally, 
while those other indicators are consistent with a fall 
after that date, the reduction registered is significantly 
less pronounced than that in the data for detected 
youth crime.   
In line with other commentators, the NAYJ has 
previously argued that the anomalous rise and 
subsequent fall in substantive disposals shown in 
official statistics can be convincingly explained in terms 
of shifts in the practice of the police and other agencies 
to accommodate successive performance indicators.7  
Those shifts in practice have required a cultural 
adjustment and a redefinition of what constitutes 
‘good’ youth justice practice. This in turn has tended to 
produce a different treatment of children who come to 
police attention.
The reforms of the New Labour government elected in 
1997, which at the time were regarded as sufficiently 
radical to warrant being called a ‘new youth justice’8, 
were predicated on pretensions of toughness that 
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manifested themselves in a determination to intervene 
early with children who infringed the criminal law, or 
were considered at risk of doing so, to ‘nip… offending 
in the bud, to prevent crime from becoming a way 
of life for so many young people’.9 Consistent with 
that ethos, once the reforms had bedded in, the 
government established a target to narrow the gap 
between offences recorded and those ‘brought to 
justice’ by increasing the number that resulted in a 
‘sanction detection’.10 The indicator required a growth 
in annual sanction detections of almost a quarter of a 
million by March 2008 against a March 2002 baseline.11 
The extent of the required rise was, arguably, arbitrary 
since it was expressed in terms of absolute numbers 
rather than a percentage of offences that come to 
police attention; certainly no justification was provided 
at the time. The target was met a year early but this 
achievement was not indicative of improvements 
in police performance, since any rise in the rate of 
detection was insufficient to account for the increase 
in substantive outcomes; it was not in other words a 
consequence of more crimes being solved.12 Rather, 
as is now generally accepted, the growth in sanction 
detections was a function of formal disposals being 
imposed for incidents that came to police attention that 
would previously have attracted an informal response.13 
Government intervention thus led directly to net-
widening, a phenomenon whereby increasingly minor 
forms of misdemeanour are drawn into the ambit of 
the formal criminal justice system.14                                                                            
The target applied both to adults and children but had a 
disproportionate impact on the latter population since 
adult offending would, in any event, have been more 
likely to be met with a formal response for a range of 
reasons: 
• as discussed below, youth offending is, on average, 
of a less serious character than that of adults
• children are less likely to have previous convictions 
(because they have had less time to accrue them); 
and 
• the police may be more inclined to adopt a more 
lenient response to those who have yet to attain 
adulthood. 
There was accordingly a greater scope to alter practice 
in the direction of an increased use of sanction 
detections in relation to children’s offending since 
there had hitherto been a greater use of informal 
responses for that group. That shift is evidenced in 
the statistical data: while between 2003 and 2007, the 
number of adults entering the criminal justice system 
rose by less than 1%, the equivalent figure for those 
below the age of 18 years was 22%. Within the latter 
cohort, those populations who might previously have 
been expected to benefit from additional latitude 
by the police (leading to a higher use of informal 
responses) were particularly adversely affected. They 
included younger children, girls and those arrested 
for petty transgressions. The introduction of the 
sanction detection measure accordingly resulted in 
the unnecessary criminalisation of large numbers of 
children by targeting ‘the unusual suspects’15 or as Rod 
Morgan, previously chair of the Youth Justice Board put 
it, by harvesting the ‘low-hanging fruit’.16  
As its implications became clear, the sanction detection 
target was criticised precisely for this tendency 
to inflate the use of criminal sanctions for minor 
lawbreaking (as well as being an inappropriate use 
of police resources).17 The rapid rise in the numbers 
of children entering the criminal justice system led 
to corresponding pressures on courts and youth 
offending teams as workloads mushroomed. Though 
the punitive sentiment (and commitment to early 
formal intervention) behind its introduction were still 
apparent in policy and practice thereafter,18 pragmatic 
considerations ensured that the target was not 
renewed. Indeed so far as youth justice was concerned, 
it was replaced by a measure with a contrary, and from 
the perspective of the NAYJ a preferable, dynamic 
whose implications were more closely aligned to the 
research base, although it seems unlikely that its 
adoption was primarily evidence-driven.19 
The Youth Crime Action Plan (YCAP), published in 2008, 
committed the government to achieving a reduction 
in the number of children entering the youth justice 
system for the first time – so called first time entrants 
(FTEs) – by 20% by 2020.20 The target had been 
included earlier in the Youth Justice Board’s Corporate 
and Business plan 2005/06 to 2007/08, but at that 
time appeared to have little impact, in part because 
the sanction detection indicator, which had a greater 
influence over police activity, was still in force. The FTE 
measure was subsequently adopted by the Coalition 
government as one of its three high level outcomes for 
youth justice in 2010,21 all of which were subsequently 
retained by the Conservative administration elected 
in May 2015. Since the June 2017 election, there have 
been few policy announcements specific to youth 
justice but, at the time of writing, there is no reason to 
anticipate that a reduction in FTEs will not continue to 
be a political priority for the foreseeable future.  
If the sanction detection target was net-widening, 
promoting the criminalisation of minor delinquency, 
the indicator which replaced it had a converse 
impetus, encouraging the police to respond in an 
informal manner to children who had had no previous 
substantive disposals, whether or not they had 
previously come to police attention. The commitment 
to formal early intervention, which had characterised 
youth justice policy for more than a decade, was thus 
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suddenly replaced by a drive to divert from the formal 
mechanics of the criminal justice system children with 
no formal antecedent history. 
YCAP failed to acknowledge that this was a policy 
reversal, simply asserting that ‘reductions in youth 
crime will principally come about if we reduce the flow 
of young people entering the criminal justice system’ 
without explaining why that should be so. (Indeed, if 
the measure of youth crime is detected offending – 
the government’s preferred indicator for reoffending 
- the statement is tautological.) While unsustainable 
workloads were, as suggested above, a consideration 
in this sharp U-turn, it is hard to ignore the financial 
context in which the shift occurred: 2008 was also the 
year that economic crisis hit the UK economy. Packing 
the justice system with children who had engaged in 
what was often trivial delinquency was an unaffordable 
expense increasingly in tension with developing 
austerity in the public sector.22 Significantly, as Pitts has 
noted, the last period in which youth diversion received 
such high level political backing, during Margaret 
Thatcher’s administration, also coincided with the onset 
of austerity.23  
The new target had an immediate impact, and like its 
predecessor, was met early: the 20% reduction was 
achieved in the first 12 months after it was formally 
adopted by the government. The fall has continued 
in the period since. As shown in figure 3, the number 
of FTEs rose between 2003 and 2007 by almost one 
third in response to the sanction detection target; by 
contrast, as the new performance measure kicked in, 
the trajectory reversed. Between 2007 and 2016, the 
number of children entering the system for the first 
time fell by 84% from 110,801 to 18,263. Since such 
children account for a sizeable proportion of all those 
who are given a formal sanction each year, there has 
been a corresponding impact on the overall volume 
of detected youth crime. The marked similarity in the 
patterns over this period shown in figures 1 and 3 is 
therefore unsurprising. 
Targeting detected offending 
The above analysis does not undermine the conclusion 
that there has been a long term fall in the underlying 
level of youth crime; rather it seeks to account for 
recent fluctuations in detected youth offending around 
that trend by reference to the predictable outcome 
of the successive implementation of two contrasting 
central government targets, without having to posit 
dramatic changes in children’s behaviour.24  
If the volume of detected youth offending can be so 
readily influenced by changes in performance indicators 
that have a direct impact on the practice of criminal 
justice agencies, a deeper question about the impact 
of policy on children in trouble is inevitably posed. As 
noted above, the New Labour administration of the 
late 1990s encouraged early intervention, through the 
use of formal sanctions, reinforcing an already punitive 
and interventionist climate towards children who broke 
the law that had emerged throughout that decade. 
The number of children who were prosecuted rose as 
a consequence, even while overall detected offending 
declined.25 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Figure 3
First time entrants to the youth justice system: 2003-2016 (year ending March) 








Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board (2017). Key characteristics of admissions to youth custody:  April 2014 
to March 2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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The sanction detection target can legitimately be 
understood as a logical culmination of that approach, 
leading to a corresponding sharper expansion in 
the criminalisation of children. The rise in detected 
youth crime generated sensationalist and unhelpful 
media reporting, suggesting that children’s delinquent 
behaviour – and particularly offending by girls (an issue 
considered in more detail below)26 – was spiralling out 
of control. This in turn exacerbated a process, noted 
by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, of demonising young people,27 sustaining a cycle 
of intolerance.28 
Moreover, from the perspective of individual children, 
this effective lowering of the threshold for entry into 
the formal criminal justice system was potentially 
damaging since a criminal record represents a 
considerable constraint on future prospects.29 There is 
a wider social concern too. A sizeable body of evidence 
confirms that early induction into the youth justice is 
‘criminogenic’: it increases the risk of recidivism.30 Net-
widening provisions emanating from a determination to 
appear ‘tough’ on law and order, such as the sanction 
detection target, are thus both inherently unfair, 
contrary to the evidence and likely to increase overall 
levels of victimisation.
Conversely, strategies of maximum diversion, wherein 
youthful misbehaviour is met wherever possible by an 
informal response, are associated with desistance from 
serious offending.31 That understanding influenced 
responses to children in trouble during the 1980s which 
were largely informed by a philosophy of ‘minimum 
necessary intervention’, and were associated with 
a large reduction in the criminalisation of children 
without any rise in the level of youth crime.32 In this 
sense, the FTE target – which effectively raises the 
threshold for formal criminal justice intervention - 
both accords better with the research evidence and is 
indicative of a more child friendly approach to youth 
justice. Indeed, developments since the introduction 
of the measure might be thought to constitute 
something of a natural experiment in this regard. If, 
as New Labour contended in the 1997 White Paper 
‘No More Excuses’33 a failure to clamp down on early 
indicators of youth criminality, and a widespread use 
of diversion from the justice system, would encourage 
further offending, then one would anticipate that any 
attempt to reduce significantly the number of FTEs 
could show only short-term gains: children benefitting 
from such lenience would be more likely to offend in 
future. On this account, one would therefore expect 
any diminution in FTEs to be time-limited and followed 
by a subsequent bulge as the failure to impose formal 
sanctions led to increases in lawless behaviour. The 
fact that such a dramatic reduction has been sustained 
for nearly a decade offers an empirical refutation of 
the purported benefits of early induction to the youth 
justice system. 
A further indication that the FTE target might 
encourage desistance is to be found in the data 
showing a decline in detected offending by young 
adults aged 18-20. A credible explanation of the pattern 
shown in the figures is that it reflects the longer term 
benefits of the target as individuals who avoided 
criminalisation as a child are able more easily to make 
the transition to a non-offending adult lifestyle. The fall 
for young adults started later than that for children —
accelerating from 2010 onwards — and has been more 
muted. Such a pattern would be consistent with the fall 
in the ‘child-offender’ population percolating through 
to the older age group since a delay of around two 
years would be anticipated.
There has also been a fall in detected offending by 
older adults, aged 21 and above, over the same period, 
but as shown in table 2, this has been considerably less 
pronounced than for either the child or young adult 
population.  Interestingly, however, the rate of decline 
has quickened sharply since 2014, at the point when 
any beneficial impact from the introduction of the FTE 
target might be expected to filter through to those in 
their twenties. 
The NAYJ therefore welcomes the FTE measure and the 
decriminalisation of large numbers of young people 
that has flowed from its introduction. (Some of the 
mechanisms through which success against the target 
has been achieved are considered in greater detail 
in due course.) However, the Association remains 
concerned that the rediscovery of diversion has been 






10-17 73,724 21,372 71%
18-20 67,980 28,126 59%
21+ 339,735 243,900 28%
Table 2
Decline in detected 
offending for different 
age groups: 2010-2016 
(indictable offences) 
Source: Derived from respective editions of Criminal Justice Statistics, published by the Ministry of Justice 
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largely a pragmatic response to the imperatives of 
austerity politics rather than an explicit endorsement of 
the benefits of minimum intervention. While punitive 
residues continue to influence youth justice policy, 
albeit at a lower level than hitherto, the gains of recent 
years may yet prove to be fragile and vulnerable to 
political reversal. 
At the same time, the fall in the throughput of the 
youth justice system has been used to legitimise 
considerable reductions in resources to youth offending 
teams, despite the fact that much of the recent decline 
in detected offending reflects a different response to 
youth crime rather than its absolute attenuation. The 
successes in relation to the FTE target have in part 
been realised precisely because youth offending teams 
have increasingly focused on non-statutory, informal, 
preventive work, delivery of which - in the absence 
of a healthy youth work sector - has tended to fall to 
youth justice staff.34 Workload has not accordingly 
fallen to the extent suggested by statutory caseloads, 
and budget cuts now put at risk services provided to 
children who come to the attention of the police but 
are not formally criminalised. 
Finally, the political commitment to diversion has 
arguably relied in part on the reality that youth crime 
is in any event falling. To the extent that there is a 
relationship between the economy and crime, albeit 
a mediated one, the continuation of that contextual 
backdrop cannot be guaranteed. The development 
of a rights-compliant, evidence-informed, ethically 
defensible underpinning for youth justice practice is 
urgently required. 
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of the system and a corresponding rise in the over-
representation of more serious lawbreaking among 
those incidents that continue to attract a formal 
disposal. Data for detected youth crime hence give a 
distorted picture of youthful offending. In this context, 
self-report studies provide a more balanced portrayal. 
The MORI youth survey, for instance, demonstrates that 
stealing is by far the most common offence committed 
by school-age children.3 
Discussion of youth criminality tends to focus on high 
profile, more serious incidents, such as gang-related 
activities, robbery, violence against the person and, 
particularly in the recent period, knife-crime. As 
indicated above, this focus is not warranted by the 
pattern of behaviour captured by self-report studies. 
Moreover, in spite of the impact of the FTE target, 
which has led to fewer less-serious matters entering the 
system, property offending remains the most common 
indictable offence type captured in the figures for 
detected youth crime: in 2016, theft alone accounted 
for almost one in three indictable matters leading to a 
substantive youth justice disposal. The second largest 
category, accounting for one in five incidents, was drug-
related offending, the majority of which are likely to 
involve possession of relatively small amounts of illicit 
substances. 
As shown in figure 4, the number of violent crimes 
remains relatively low, accounting for slightly more 
 chapter 4  The face of youth crime
It’s not unusual
If the precise measurement of youth crime is rendered 
problematic by a range of epistemological difficulties, 
two things are clear. First, risk-taking behaviour — 
including lawbreaking – is quite common during the 
period of transition associated with the teenage 
years and such behaviour has generated concern 
among adults consistently throughout history.1 This 
increased prevalence of offending during adolescence 
is confirmed by self-report studies: for instance, the 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey found that, over 
a four-year period, almost half of young people aged 
10- 25 years had committed at least one offence.2 Such 
surveys also highlight the second most significant fact 
about youth crime: most of it is relatively minor. 
While, as outlined above, official statistics understate 
the extent of youth crime, they also, and for similar 
reasons, tend to exaggerate its seriousness. Minor 
incidents are more likely to remain undetected 
because victims are less inclined to report them and, 
where the police are notified, they may not merit the 
allocation of resources necessary for detection and 
processing. Where children engaged in such activities 
are apprehended, the authorities frequently use 
their discretion to avoid a formal outcome. This latter 
dynamic has been reinforced by the FTE target which 
has involved a filtering of more trivial matters out 
Figure 4
Children receiving a youth 
caution, youth conditional 
caution or conviction 
by offence type as a 
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Justice statistics 2016 - England and Wales. 
London: Ministry of Justice
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than one in 10 of all indictable detected offending (a 
slight increase of around 2% over the previous year). 
Robbery too is relatively infrequent at less than 5% of 
all offences (a reduction from the previous two years). 
Just 3% of indictable incidents involved sexually harmful 
behaviour. While some offences falling within these 
categories can be serious, it would be a mistake to 
assume that they all are: during the year 2016 44% of 
violent offences and 35% of sexual offences attracted a 
youth caution or youth conditional caution, indicating 
that they were below the level of seriousness that 
requires prosecution in the public interest. It should be 
emphasised, that, since these figures omit summary 
offences, they considerably overstate the gravity of 
youth offending because large numbers of less serious 
incidents are excluded. Nonetheless, it is a matter of 
some concern that there has been a rise, from 8% 
to 12% over the past two years, in the proportion of 
offences that are weapons-related. Part of this increase 
might be understood as a consequence of a growing 
policy focus on the extent of knife crime, leading 
to a higher level of reporting to the police by other 
agencies, such as schools, who might previously have 
dealt with the issue internally. Detection is also likely 
to have increased as a consequence of the introduction 
of various forms of enforcement-related activities – 
such as the deployment of knife arches. The nature of 
the current discourse is also such that possession of a 
weapon is rarely met with an informal response from 
the police. 
In any event, there has been a substantial increase in 
the number of children given a formal youth justice 
disposal for knife possession since the introduction of 
mandatory custodial penalties for a second offence 
for children aged 16-17 years, from 757 in the first 
quarter of 2015, to 1,150 in the equivalent period of 
2017. There has also been an associated growth in 
the number of custodial sentences imposed for such 
offences, from 505 to 613, an issue discussed further 
in due course.4 In this context, it should be noted that 
research has suggested that, in some high crime areas, 
children report carrying knives for self-protection.5 
The rise in weapons offences has not been reflected in 
an increase in homicides. Seven children below the age 
of 18 years – of whom one was a girl - were convicted 
of murder; three children were convicted of attempted 
murder and six children (all boys) were convicted of 
manslaughter. As with all ‘rare’ crime types, the actual 
number of homicides committed by persons below 18 
years of age fluctuates from year to year - but it has 
tended to be remain relatively stable recently, with 
what appears to be a reduction in the most recent 
period. The combined annual figure for children 
convicted of murder or manslaughter stood at 38 in 
1989, 33 in 1999,6 38 in 2009,7 27 in 2014, 19 in 2015 
and 13 in 2016. 
Growing up
The nature of adolescent risk-taking, described 
above, is such that children are more likely to commit 
offences than their adult counterparts. Nonetheless, 
because the former constitute a minority of the overall 
population, adults are responsible for a much greater 
volume of crime. As shown in figure 5, during 2016, 
children committed less than one in 20 of all detected 
offences (summary and indictable), a proportion that 
has fallen from 11% since 2008 in line with the decline 
in FTEs.8 By contrast,  90% of crime was committed by 
adults aged 21 years and over.9   
One obvious yet seldom-remarked implication of 
offending-rates ‘peaking’ during adolescence is that 
they diminish thereafter. There is substantial evidence 
that as young people make the transition to adulthood 
there is an accompanying shift to a more law-abiding 
lifestyle. Indeed, falling criminality as age increases has 
been called ‘one of the brute facts of criminology’.10 In 
2016, for instance, the rate of offending per 100,000 
of the population aged 15-17 years was four and a half 
times higher than that for those aged 21 years or older 
(see figure 6 on page 20). Although the reasons for 
this phenomenon remain contested, there are several 
potential mechanisms by which maturation might be 
linked to desistance. Sociological explanations, for 
instance, tend to emphasise the changing social roles 
Figure 5
Detected offending by 
age range (indictable and 
summary offences): 2016 
Aged 10-17: 3%
Aged 18-20: 7%
Aged 21 and over: 90%
Source: Ministry of Justice (2017)
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that children increasingly occupy as they approach their 
late teens and early adulthood: becoming independent 
of their parents, entering the jobs market, engaging 
in long term relationships and taking additional 
responsibility for the care of others. These new roles 
are associated with expectations of different behaviours 
and, from a practical perspective, allow less time for 
hanging around the street with groups of friends; 
an environment that can readily give rise to activity 
that might attract police attention.11 Other more 
psychologically-leaning accounts point to the impact 
of maturation on improved impulse control, a greater 
capacity for consequential thinking and increased 
empathy for others.12  These forms of explanation 
are not, of course, mutually exclusive since social and 
psychological changes are contemporaneous and may 
be mutually reinforcing. 
Implicit in both types of account is the idea that 
maturity leads to a shift in the young person’s identity 
as they come to regard themselves as an adult; the 
shift being one that promotes desistance in most 
cases.13 However, as McNeill has recently pointed 
out, successful transition in this regard also involves 
an element of reciprocity. This takes the form of a 
recognition by the state and the community that the 
young person’s identity has modified: the provision 
of legitimate opportunities for full participation in the 
adult world is a crucial element of such recognition.14 
Where employment opportunities are fewer, access 
to independent accommodation restricted, and 
discrimination against young people with criminal 
records more entrenched, there is an associated risk of 
‘extended adolescence’ that might inhibit the natural 
processes of growing out of crime.15 Austerity measures 
have the potential to exacerbate such outcomes. 
For current purposes, it is also clear that youth justice 
policy and practice can themselves encourage or hinder 
maturational development. The idea that, if left to 
their own devices, most children will naturally stop 
offending, was a central tenet of youth justice practice 
during the 1980s which aimed to minimise children’s 
contact with the youth justice system precisely because 
such contact was understood as interfering with natural 
developmental processes.16 New Labour’s rationale 
for reform of the youth justice system challenged 
this consensus. Relying on the Audit Commission’s 
influential 1996 report, Misspent Youth,17 the Home 
Office asserted that ‘the research evidence shows that 
[growing out of crime] does not happen’.18 
The Audit Commission’s position derived from a 
simplistic reading of the data on detected crime to 
conclude that the peak age of offending had risen, 
implying that maturation was no longer so clearly 
associated with desistance. But, as outlined above, 
the link between detected offending and actual 
lawbreaking is highly attenuated. While it was true 
that figures for the former showed an increase in the 
age at which children were subject to youth justice 
outcomes, such a pattern was consistent with a number 
of developments not considered by the authors of the 
report. The period selected by the Audit Commission 
was one in which young people were increasingly 
diverted from the formal justice system; younger 
children were particularly likely to benefit from such 
diversionary impulses, leading to an increase in the 
average age of those entering the system. The data 
were accordingly not indicative of a failure of older 
children to give up offending but of the effective 
decriminalisation of large numbers of their younger 
counterparts.19 New Labour policies predicated on the 
Figure 6
Indictable offences per 
100,000 population by age 
bands: 2016  
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necessity of intervening early through the youth justice 
system to ‘nip offending in the bud’ were accordingly 
vulnerable to criticism and based on a flawed 
understanding of the evidence.  
A similar dynamic is associated with the fall in FTEs 
which, as shown later in the paper, has impacted 
particularly sharply on younger children, leading to a 
rise in the average age of those receiving substantive 
disposals: in 2007, the peak age of offending for males 
was 17 years;20 by 2013, it had risen to 19 years. More 
recent figures are not available at this level of (age 
specific) detail but, as shown in figure 6, the peak age of 
both male and female offending in 2016 was between 
18 and 20 years. The pattern thereafter continues to 
show clear evidence of growing out of crime.21  
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Poverty is risky 
As previously noted, behaviour that infringes the 
criminal law is quite widespread among teenagers from 
all backgrounds, but most of that illegal activity does 
not result in a formal youth justice sanction. A recent 
self-report study for instance found that less than half 
of children who admitted offending within the previous 
12 months had been caught by the police. Moreover, 
the most common outcome for those who were 
apprehended, accounting for 28% of such cases, was 
that nothing happened as a consequence. A further 
20% of children indicated that they had to apologise to 
the victim. (It is not clear from the report whether such 
apologies involved a formal disposal or an informal 
response such as a community resolution.)1 
But if youth criminal behaviour is common, children 
who typically come to the attention of criminal 
justice agencies are ‘disproportionately drawn from 
working class backgrounds with biographies replete 
with examples of vulnerability’.2 A number of reasons 
have been proposed for this disproportion. First, 
there is a correlation between economically deprived 
areas, characterised by above-average levels of 
unemployment and poor access to services, and 
higher levels of crime and victimisation.3 Residence in 
such neighbourhoods is accordingly much more likely 
to bring children into contact with forms of illegal 
behaviour which become part of the fabric of their 
everyday lives. It is this geographical concentration 
that explains, at least in part, the significant overlap 
between young people who offend and those who 
are victims of crime: they are frequently the same 
cohort from the same deprived areas.4 Second, the 
experience of growing up poor is one that is typically 
associated with characteristics such as adverse family 
circumstances, poor schooling and higher levels of ill 
health, (as well as subjective wellbeing5) each of which 
increases the likelihood offending. Moreover, the longer 
a child lives in poverty, the higher the chance that he or 
she will engage in delinquent activity. As Kingston and 
Webster have argued: 
‘It is the longevity and recurrence of poverty that 
adversely influences family processes causing 
disruption and emotional stress. Long-term 
poverty influences the resources and therefore 
opportunities available to children and young 
people and their emotional security, and has the 
strongest impact on criminal involvement.’6
Children living in areas of high density housing are more 
likely to socialise in larger groups, and in public spaces, 
thereby attracting the attention of the authorities 
for behaviour which might be overlooked in other 
settings. This is exacerbated by the operation of the 
youth justice system itself which, it has been argued, 
consists of a ‘series of filters’ that tend to operate to 
the disadvantage of children whose circumstances 
are embedded in ‘economic adversity’, and reinforce 
each other at every decision-making stage.7 Similar 
behaviour by middle-class and working class children 
might, as a result of such filtering, attract quite different 
forms of response.   
Such processes also help to explain the over-
representation of minority ethnic children within the 
youth justice system (an issue considered further in 
due course) since the communities from which such 
children derive are disproportionately poor. In this 
instance, direct and indirect forms of discrimination, 
on the basis of ethnicity, exacerbate the impact of 
disadvantage.8 
The disproportionate criminalisation of looked-
after children, a subject that has rightly received 
considerable attention over the course of the past year,9 
is consistent with accounts predicated on a relationship 
between socio-economic status and contact with the 
youth justice system since their life experiences as 
children in care are typically characterised by high 
levels of abuse, victimisation, deprivation and other 
forms of adversity. According to figures collated by 
the Department for Education, looked-after children 
are five times more likely than their peers in the 
general population to be subject to a formal youth 
justice disposal.10 Moreover, these figures are almost 
certainly an underestimate since they relate to those 
who have been continuously in care for 12 months 
or longer and more than half (52%) of children who 
acquire care status are looked-after for periods shorter 
than one year.11  At the upper end of the youth justice 
system, the extent of over-representation increases: 
37% of children in secure training centres and 39% of 
boys in young offender institutions report having care 
experience.12   
 chapter 5  What are they like?  
The characteristics of children in conflict with the law
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designed explicitly to capture such risks within its 12 
domains.18 
The ‘risk factor paradigm’, as it has become known, has 
come under extensive criticism for treating children as 
‘crash test dummies’ whose fate is largely determined 
by the risks which they embody, rather than regarding 
them as active individuals with a capacity to make 
choices, albeit that their options may be constrained 
by their socio-economic position.19 As a consequence, 
risk-led intervention inevitably tends to undermine 
engagement between children and their supervisors 
since it focuses attention on correcting supposed 
deficits within the child and his or her family rather 
than adopting a future orientation that aims to ensure 
that young people achieve their entitlements, equip 
them to develop a sense of agency and empower 
them to develop an alternative, pro-social, personal 
narrative, equivalent to a shift in identity.20 In this 
context, opportunities are missed for more effective 
forms of supervision underpinned by the establishment 
of high quality relationships.21 A focus on ‘desistance’, 
by contrast, understands children as ‘subjects with 
whom youth justice workers should engage in their 
own interests’ and involves an explicit recognition that 
children in trouble may have done wrong but are also 
likely themselves to have been victims of injustice in 
various guises.22  
The risk paradigm, because it targets the supposed 
deficiencies of individual children and their families 
rather than understanding children’s criminal behaviour 
as a normalised response to the environment within 
which they grow up,23 thus locates:
‘...the responsibility (blame) … with the young 
person and their inability to resist risk factors, 
rather than examining broader issues such as 
… social class, poverty, unemployment, social 
deprivation, neighbourhood disorganisation, 
ethnicity’.24 
While it is true that there is a statistical correlation 
between supposed risk factors — such as not attending 
school or taking drugs — and offending, research 
evidence suggests that the influence of the child’s 
material surroundings is often sufficient to mediate the 
impact of many individual deficits. In one American 
study, boys with no identifiable risk factors from the 
most disadvantaged neighbourhoods were fifteen times 
as likely to have committed serious offences as those 
from the most affluent areas. As shown in table 3 (on 
the next page), the presence of additional indicators of 
risk was accordingly likely to play a much bigger role in 
explaining the offending of boys residing in the latter 
type of neighbourhood than of those living in poorer 
areas.25 Risk is, it would appear, much more prevalent 
in poorer areas; but such areas generate significantly 
Broadly speaking, attempts to account for higher levels 
of criminalisation among the care population have 
tended to focus on two forms of explanation. The first 
notes that children in care share with other young 
people who offend histories grounded in various forms 
of disadvantage which appear to make delinquent 
behaviour more likely; the factors that lead to children 
coming into care are associated with emotional and 
behavioural difficulties and lowered resilience. A 
second approach highlights the potentially negative 
consequences of the care experience itself on children 
and points to structural features of the care and justice 
systems which increase the prospect of criminalisation. 
Placement instability, negative peer group influences, a 
lower threshold for involving the police as a mechanism 
of control and service shortcomings combine to make 
it more likely that children’s behaviour will be managed 
through a criminal justice lens. Such dynamics are 
particularly at play for children placed in residential 
provision which can intensify, create and promote 
criminal behaviour.13 While logically distinct, it is clear 
that these explanatory models are intertwined in 
practice. As Jo Staines for instance, has convincingly 
argued:
Children who enter care having experienced 
abuse and trauma are then particularly 
vulnerable to being negatively influenced by 
relationships and experiences within care. [The] 
impact of this interaction is then exacerbated 
by involvement in the youth justice system 
itself, which can further criminalise looked after 
children’.14
The correlation with disadvantage becomes more 
pronounced in relation to children who are involved in 
more serious or persistent offending. A recent study 
of children in police custody for instance established 
that ‘general entrants’ to the youth justice system each 
experienced an average of 2.9 ‘vulnerabilities’, but 
that the equivalent figure for boys affiliated to gangs 
was seven and, for girl gang affiliates, 9.5.15 Analysis 
by the Youth Justice Board of youth offending team 
assessments at the point of admission to the secure 
estate, between 2014 and 2016, found that 61% of 
children were not engaging in education, 45% had 
problems with substance misuse and one third were 
suffering from mental ill health.16  
Such findings might suggest that responses to children 
in trouble should focus on ensuring their longer term 
wellbeing. In recent years, however, this evidence of 
extensive welfare need has been recast in the form 
of ‘risk factors’ that are thought to be predictive 
of involvement in criminal activity, an approach 
that Jo Phoenix has characterised as ‘oppressive 
welfarism’.17 The development of Asset, until recently 
the standardised youth justice assessment tool, was 
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account in relation to all matters that affect them and 
commits the Board to: 
• ‘embedding young people’s participation in how 
we support, advise and monitor the youth justice 
system;
• helping government and our strategic partners 
when they make decisions - to take more notice of 
young people’s voices;
• giving young people a say in how we plan, deliver 
and evaluate our own activities’.30
The strategy represents a considerable advancement 
given that a previous study, conducted in 2009, found 
that expectations within youth justice practice were 
that children should be engaged rather than enabled to 
have a genuine say in planning their intervention. The 
authors of that report noted a number of obstacles to 
embedding participation including ambivalence as to 
whether children who offend ‘deserve’ to have their 
voices heard, and an ambiguity between the enabling 
and enforcement role of youth justice practitioners.31 
To what extent the Board’s strategy will mitigate those 
obstacles remains to be seen.  
Age
By definition, all children processed for offending fall 
within the 10-17 age bracket. A number of factors 
combine to ensure that those who receive youth justice 
disposals are clustered towards the upper end of that 
range: older children are more likely to come to the 
attention of police more frequently by dint of the fact 
that they have more access to public space; the peak 
age of offending coincides with the late teenage years; 
and any discretion exercised by the police to deal with 
illegal behaviour without resort to formal sanctions will 
tend to be exercised where the suspect is a younger 
child.  In 2016, children aged 15-17 years accounted 
for almost 78% of those receiving a formal pre-court 
disposal or conviction for an indictable offence. 
Conversely, just over 1% were below the age of 12 
years. The full distribution is given in figure 7.
At a broad level, this age-clustering is an enduring 
feature of the youth justice system. However, for 
reasons discussed earlier in the paper, the distribution 
is not static but subject to fluctuation in line with the 
vicissitudes of policy and practice that determine the 
circumstances under which children are criminalised. 
Most recently, for instance, the FTE target has tended 
to filter out younger children from the system at a 
faster rate than their older counterparts, leading to a 
reduction in the representation of this cohort: in 2008, 
children aged 10-11 years accounted for 3% of all youth 
justice disposals but, as indicated above, the equivalent 
figure for 2016 was just 1%.  
higher levels of youth crime whether or not the 
individuals who engage in such behaviour display such 
risks.
More recent evidence, derived from the Edinburgh 
Study of Youth Transitions provides confirmation of 
this hypothesis. At age 13, youth violence is ‘strongly 
associated with poverty at the individual and household 
level’. Significantly, for the current context, these 
relationships persist even when individual risk and 
protective factors are controlled for. While boys are 
much more likely to engage in violent behaviour than 
girls, the relationship between poverty and violence 
applies to both males and females: girls living in 
poverty are also ‘at elevated risk of being violent’.26 
It is for such reasons that, while it is true that many 
children in contact with youth justice agencies will 
display more ‘risks’ than those who do not come to the 
attention of the justice system, predicting from an early 
age which children will or will not offend, on the basis 
of their risk profile, proves to be extremely difficult.27
Such criticisms have begun to influence youth justice 
policy. AssetPlus, for example, developed by the Youth 
Justice Board to replace Asset, is designed to balance 
risk alongside ‘consideration of a young person’s needs, 
goals and strengths’ and to reflect elements of the 
desistance literature.28 While the risk paradigm is still 
evident within the revised framework,29 one welcome 
development is that that the child’s own understanding 
of their situation features as one of four equally 
weighted sources of information, potentially promoting 
the evolution of more participatory approaches to 
youth justice intervention. Further encouragement 
in this regard has come more recently in the form of 
a ‘Participation strategy’, published by the Board in 
November 2016 which makes explicit reference to the 
right in Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child that children’s views should be taken into 
Number of risk 
factors
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paper, the terms of reference of the Taylor review 
explicitly precluded consideration of the issue and in 
the course of its 56 pages, the report does not mention 
the age of criminal responsibility once.35
Girls and boys
If, as suggested earlier, the age-crime curve is one of 
the few certainties in criminology, a second enduring 
truth is that offending is predominantly a male activity. 
Girls are consistently less likely than boys to come 
into contact with youth justice agencies; they commit 
fewer and less serious offences; and grow out of crime 
more successfully and at a lower age.36 In 2016, 2,742 
girls received a substantive youth justice disposal for 
an indictable offence, representing less than 13% of 
the total; 26% of girls’ offending that led to a formal 
disposal involved theft, compared to 18% for boys; 
and the female reoffending rate within 12 months of 
caution or conviction was 27.6% compared to a male 
rate of 40.3%. 
Over the longer period, there has been a substantial 
decline in the number of females entering the 
system, with detected offending by girls falling by 
92% since 1992. This pattern is hard to square with 
a common perception, frequently inflamed by the 
media, that girls’ behaviour is a bigger problem than 
it has been hitherto.37 Much of the recent moral panic 
in this regard, derives from a short period during 
which the sanction detection target led to rapidly 
rising criminalisation, generating media claims of an 
‘unprecedented crime wave among teenage girls’.38 
Between 2003 and 2007, coinciding with the 
introduction of the sanction detection indicator, there 
was a pronounced escalation in the number of girls 
entering the youth justice system. Significantly, as 
detailed in figure 8 (which shows changes in girls’ and 
boys’ offending from a 2003 baseline), this increase 
was considerably sharper than that for boys, at 35% 
compared to 20%, suggesting that the target had a 
Conversely, in the period prior to the adoption of the 
FTE target, the focus on maximising sanction detections 
led to a more rapid rise in the number of younger 
children subject to formal outcomes since this group 
had previously benefited from a higher use of informal 
responses. Consequently, while the number of 10-
14 years-olds receiving a substantive disposal for an 
indictable offence increased by almost a third between 
2003 and 2007, the equivalent growth for those aged 
15-17 years was a more modest 20%. 
Despite the welcome reduction in the number of 
younger children who enter the system, the potential 
for any child to be criminalised remains subject to the 
age of criminal responsibility. In England and Wales, 
the threshold at which children become criminally 
liable is just 10 years of age; considerably below that in 
most other European jurisdictions. The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has consistently 
criticised the United Kingdom in this regard, indicating 
that 12 years is the absolute minimum acceptable age 
consistent with international standards of children’s 
human rights.32 In its most recent report on the UK’s 
compliance with the Convention, published in 2016, 
the Committee noted that, while Scotland was in the 
process of raising its age of criminal liability, there had 
been no progress in the rest of the United Kingdom. 
The Committee again recommended that the age 
of criminal responsibility should be increased ‘in 
accordance with acceptable international standards’.33 
The relatively small number of children in the lower 
age-ranges formally processed by the justice system 
makes reform in this regard appear increasingly 
sensible. On the other hand, given the evidence that 
shifts in policy and practice could rapidly lead to a 
reversal of recent trends and a recurrence of the 
criminalisation of large numbers of young children, it 
also appears increasingly necessary. The NAYJ considers 
that the age of criminal responsibility should be raised 
to 16 years in line with the age of consent.34 Successive 
governments have however shown little appetite for 
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females within the justice system has risen more rapidly 
than that for boys. 
The history of child incarceration also demonstrates 
that the treatment of girls is particularly sensitive to 
shifts in policy and practice. Between 1992 and 2001, 
for instance, youth custodial sentencing rose by more 
than 90% (in spite of the fact that youth crime was 
falling) but the impact on girls of this punitive dynamic 
was considerably more alarming, with an increase 
in sentences of imprisonment imposed on females – 
albeit from a low baseline – of 500%.41 Conversely, with 
the onset of decarceration from 2008 onwards, the fall 
in the number of girls detained in the secure estate has, 
as shown in figure 9, dropped much more sharply than 
the number of boys. 
Evidence suggests that girls in conflict with the law 
are significantly more vulnerable than their male 
counterparts on a range of indicators.42 This is certainly 
true for those deprived of their liberty: as table 4 
demonstrates, girls admitted to custody are more than 
twice as likely as boys to be considered at risk of suicide 
or self-harm and are more likely to have identified 
concerns in relation to physical and mental ill health.43
Such extensive need among the female offending 
population, in combination with the fact that girls 
are less likely than boys to reoffend, can prove 
problematic: youth justice assessments predicated 
on risk factors will systematically over-predict the 
likelihood of recidivism in girls, potentially resulting 
greater net-widening impact on the female population.  
This gendered pattern is readily explained by the 
fact that the more limited, less serious, nature of 
girls’ offending (and the persistence of paternalistic 
attitudes) had traditionally been associated with a 
higher use of police discretion to deal informally with 
female behaviour; the scope for increasing the use of 
formal sanctions was accordingly more extensive in the 
case of girls.39 
As the FTE target took hold, there was an associated 
marked decline in detected offending by all children. 
However, as shown in figure 8, the general fall masked 
a faster reduction for girls as the logic of the new 
performance measure encouraged higher levels of 
diversion, which inevitably had larger consequences 
for females since their offending tends to be less 
serious and prolific. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
dramatic decline, although it has persisted for a far 
longer duration than the preceding short term rise, has 
not garnered as much press attention as that earlier 
increase.40 
A similar process explains why the peak age of female 
offending is higher than that for males in spite of the 
evidence, cited above, that girls tend to grow out of 
crime at a younger age. The decriminalisation of many 
children that has accompanied the increased focus 
on diversion, has served to prevent younger girls, in 
particular, from being made subject to substantive 
disposals, thereby ensuring that the average age of 









Source: Derived from respective editions of Criminal Justice Statistics
Figure 8
Changes in detected offending relative to a 2003 baseline by gender (1.5 
represents a rise of 50%; 0.5% a fall of 50%): indictable offences
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to be imprisoned, implying that the lenience that is 
afforded to young women in many circumstances is 
withdrawn where their behaviour transcends female 
norms. In such cases, girls become ‘doubly deviant’ 
and the treatment meted out to them reflects their 
contravention of both the law and expectations of 
femininity.46 Such injustices have led to an increasing 
insistence on the importance of gender-specific 
programmes but Sharpe and Gelsthorpe have 
cautioned that, however well-intentioned such 
developments are, to the extent that they operate 
within a criminal justice context, they are unlikely to 
combat the institutional adversity experienced by, and 
lack of welfare support offered to, girls from the most 
disadvantaged and victimised backgrounds.47 At the end 
of May 2017, for instance, there were just 31 girls in the 
custodial estate; this small number – while welcome on 
one level – generates significant systematic difficulties 
for the provision of appropriate levels of care and 
support such as those that arise from the probability 
that girls will be placed, on average, significantly further 
from home than their male counterparts.   
Race, ethnicity and 
criminalisation 
It has long been recognised that criminal justice 
systems are disproportionately populated by people 
from black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) 
backgrounds. One consequence of that recognition is 
that, since 1991, the government has been required to 
publish information to assist criminal justice agencies 
to meet their duty to avoid discrimination on the 
grounds of race. More recently, in January 2016, the 
government asked David Lammy, MP for Tottenham, 
in higher levels of intervention than would otherwise 
be warranted by their law breaking.44 Moreover, the 
limited research in this field suggests that at least 
some of the vulnerabilities displayed by girls in trouble 
have developed as a consequence of a history of 
‘welfare inaction’ and ‘their abandonment by helping 
professionals’.45
There has been a more recent recognition that 
‘gender neutral’ responses to youth crime have 
disadvantaged girls, particularly where gendered 
assumptions continue to underlie decision making. It 
has been noted, for instance, that girls convicted of 
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accounted for 7% of those receiving a substantive 
youth justice disposal for the first time; the equivalent 
figure in 2015/16 was 12%. (Although of the course, the 
slower fall is itself in need of explanation.) 
A further issue of concern is that overrepresentation 
increases in line with the intensity of youth justice 
intervention: BAME children who enter the system 
are in other words more likely to receive higher levels 
of punishment. As shown in table 6, during 2015/16, 
BAME children comprised 19% of children receiving a 
caution or conviction but accounted for more than one 
third of those receiving a custodial sentence and more 
than half of those imprisoned for more than two years. 
Black children are seven-and-a-half times more likely 
to receive a long term custodial sentence49 than would 
be anticipated from their representation in the general 
10-17 population. 
The over-representation of BAME children among those 
receiving custodial disposals has increased sharply in 
recent years. This rise is reflected in the composition of 
the population of the secure estate: while the overall 
number of children consigned to custody has declined, 
that decline has been significantly less marked for 
BAME children. Population figures reflect the length 
of stay in the secure estate as well as the numbers of 
children entering it and, as a consequence, the fact 
that the majority of long term prison sentences are 
reserved for BAME children has further exacerbated the 
overall trend. As shown in figure 10, while in May 2005, 
to lead an independent review to investigate the 
treatment of, and outcomes for, BAME individuals 
within the criminal justice system. The review is 
expected to publish its final report in September 2017 
but in an open letter to the Prime Minister in November 
2016, describing his early findings, Lammy notes that, 
particularly as regards the use of custody, the problem 
of minority ethnic overrepresentation is ‘worse for 
under 18s’.48
Consistent with that observation, BAME children, 
viewed as a single group, are over-represented in 
the youth justice system. It is however important to 
note that the picture varies by ethnic background. As 
shown in table 5, relative to their make up in the 10-
17 population, Asian children are under-represented 
among those receiving a substantive youth justice 
disposal; by contrast 1.8 times as many black children 
come to the attention of the youth justice system 
as would be expected given the composition of the 
general population within the relevant age range. 
The extent of BAME representation has tended to 
rise over time: between 2009/10 and 2015/16, the 
proportion of all children subject to a substantive youth 
justice disposal classified as white fell from 84% to 75% 
with a corresponding expansion in the representation 
of minority children. At least some of the increase 
is explained by the fact that the fall in FTEs has not 
benefited minority ethnic children to the same extent 
as their white counterparts: in 2007/08, black children 
 
White Asian Black Mixed 
heritage
General 10-17 population  
(2011 mid-year estimate)
81% 9% 4% 4%
Youth offending population
2009/10 84% 4% 6% 4%
2010/11 82% 4% 7% 4%
2011/12 80% 4% 8% 5%
2012/13 81% 4% 8% 4%
2013/14 75% 5% 8% 5%
2014/15 78% 5% 9% 5%
2015/16 75% 5% 9% 6%
Table 5
Representation by ethnicity of children in the 10-17 population and in the youth 
justice system: 2009/10 to 2015/16 
Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board (2017). Key characteristics of admissions to youth custody:  April 
2014 to March 2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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poverty; factors that are, as noted earlier, associated 
with increased levels of victimisation and offending. 
Consistent with this evidence, more recent research 
has confirmed that black and mixed heritage children 
within the youth justice system have significantly higher 
levels of need (as measured by scores in the different 
domains of Asset50) than their white counterparts, 
suggesting that they have endured more adverse 
previous histories.51  There is evidence, too, that 
BAME children may be less likely to trust authority, 
feeling that criminal justice agencies – in particular the 
police - discriminate against them: such sentiments 
go some way to explain the fact that minority ethnic 
children are less likely to make admissions in police 
interviews, meaning that they are not eligible for pre-
court disposals and may be regarded as unsuitable for 
interventions such as restorative justice.52  
At the same time, self-report surveys cast considerable 
doubt as to whether the extent of over-representation 
shown in the figures can be fully explained by 
the pattern of offending by BAME children.53 It is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that discrimination 
in various guises accounts for at least some of the 
‘disproportionality’ registered in the statistics.54 
As part of his independent review, David Lammy 
commissioned an analysis of disproportionality by 
ethnicity across the criminal justice system, which 
includes findings in relation to children that shed some 
light on the stages of the youth justice process that 
have the biggest impact on overrepresentation.55 
The analysis found that BAME children were almost 
three times as likely to be arrested as their white 
minority ethnic children accounted for one quarter 
of those in custody, by the same month in 2007, that 
proportion had risen to 45%.
One might anticipate that the high levels of 
disadvantage experienced by minority ethnic 
communities would lead to higher levels of contact with 
the youth justice system. A Home Affairs Committee 
inquiry into young black people and the criminal 
justice system in 2007 concluded that the primary 
cause of over-representation was social exclusion 
and disadvantage. Minority ethnic young people 
are more likely than their white counterparts to be 
raised in deprived neighbourhoods and to experience 
White Asian Black Mixed 
heritage
All youth justice 
disposals
75% 5% 9% 5%
Court convictions 73% 5% 11% 7%
Custodial sentences 62% 7% 18% 9%
Long term custody 46% 13% 30% 10%
Table 6
Representation by ethnicity at different 
stages of the youth justice system: 
2015/16
Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board (2017). Key 
characteristics of admissions to youth custody:  April 2014 to 
March 2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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counterparts. This broad figure however disguised 
variations between ethnic groups: Asian boys were 
significantly less likely than their white peers to be 
arrested. Disproportionality at this point in the system 
is particularly significant because it ‘influences the 
raw number of defendants proceeding through the 
courts system and ultimately into prison if convicted 
and sentenced’. As a consequence of higher arrest 
rates, BAME children would thus be overrepresented in 
custody even if no disproportionality occurred at other 
decision-making points. 
In the event, the analysis did find evidence of 
disproportionate outcomes elsewhere but at later 
stages these were not so marked as those at the 
gateway to the system. Black and mixed heritage 
boys were more likely to be charged than white male 
children. Once cases proceeded to prosecution, the 
overrepresentation of BAME boys among those sent 
to Crown Court – where long term sentences are 
available – was particularly stark:  black young males 
were almost 60% more likely than white boys to be 
committed to the Crown Court and Asian boys were 
nearly 2.5 times more likely to be tried in that venue by 
comparison with white young males.
Black boys proceeded against in the youth court were 
less likely to be found guilty and, if convicted, were 
significantly more likely to be sentenced to custody. For 
every white boy imprisoned, 1.2 black and 1.4 mixed 
heritage young males received a DTO. BAME children 
tried in the Crown Court were significantly more likely 
to plead not guilty but rates of imprisonment were 
broadly comparable to those for white children. The 
overrepresentation of BAME children among those 
receiving sentences of long term detention would thus 
appear to be largely a function of the decision as to 
where the case should be tried. 
The NAYJ considers that addressing the over-
representation of children from minority ethnic 
backgrounds is one of the most pressing issues faced 
by the youth justice system, since the prevailing pattern 
seriously undermines the ability of that system to 
deliver justice to children.56 The NAYJ is also concerned 
that other groups – including gypsies, travellers 
and unaccompanied asylum seekers - are also over-
represented among those who come to the attention 
of criminal justice agencies. The lack of consistent 
data however means that less attention is paid to 
such communities.57 Nonetheless, the data which are 
available provide further compelling evidence that the 
youth justice system is, in effect, a repository for the 
punishment of the most vulnerable children in society.
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agencies, such as those associated with social care, 
education and youth justice, also play a regulatory role). 
As noted above, the manner in which this function is 
performed is critical for the subsequent pathways of 
children in conflict with the law, since the police are 
effectively the gatekeepers who, albeit sometimes in 
deliberation with other agencies, determine whether 
the individual will enter the formal youth justice system 
or be diverted from it. 
For many children, encounters with the police take the 
form of stop and search, a procedure which Authorised 
Professional Practice issued by the College of Policing 
acknowledges may be more traumatic for children and 
can have ‘long-term effects on their perceptions of the 
police’.4  Stop and search is also one of the four priority 
areas for the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s ‘National 
strategy for the policing of children and young people’, 
which confirms that an inappropriate use of the power 
can undermine confidence in the police and ‘give rise to 
strong feelings and resentment’. 5 
Statistics on stop and search are not disaggregated 
by age but the All Party Parliamentary Group for 
Children has concluded that more than one million 
children were stopped and searched between 2009 
and 2013. The figure is almost certainly a substantial 
under-estimate since it is based on returns from 
just 26 of the 44 police services. Nonetheless, the 
estimate is still considerably higher than the number 
of children (893,000) arrested over the same period. 
Conversely, the majority of arrests are not pursuant 
to a stop and search. It is therefore clear that many 
children are searched unnecessarily. (Of even greater 
concern perhaps is data provided by 22 police services 
indicating that 1,136 of those searched were below the 
age of criminal responsibility.)6  
The use of stop and search has fallen in recent years: 
in 2001/02, 741,000 searches were conducted (on 
children and adults) under section 1 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act; by 2009/10, that figure had 
risen to 1,177,327, but subsequently it began to decline 
rapidly so that, in 2015/16, the procedure was used on 
386,474 occasions.7 The latter trend is largely explained 
by increasing criticism that stop and search is used 
in a discriminatory fashion and is largely ineffective.8 
Research undertaken in 2017 confirmed that young 
BAME men believe they are unfairly targeted by the 
 chapter 6  Keeping children out of  
the system 
The NAYJ considers that wherever possible children in 
trouble should be dealt with outside the parameters 
of the criminal justice system. There is compelling 
evidence that formal sanctioning – at least as currently 
configured - interferes with the natural processes of 
desistance through maturation, undermines the delivery 
of mainstream service provision, imposes punishment 
inappropriately on children who are overwhelmingly 
victims of social injustice, increases the prospect 
that the child will adopt a ‘delinquent’ identity and, 
accordingly, exacerbates the risk of further offending.1
Such an understanding was widely accepted during the 
1980s by practitioners, academics and, significantly, 
the government. Guidance to the police in 1985, for 
instance, endorsed the merits of decriminalisation, 
counselling against a presumption that youth offending 
should require a formal response, ‘as against a 
decision to take less formal action or no further action 
at all’.2 One consequence was what has been called 
the ‘successful revolution’ of that decade, whose 
characteristics pre-figured in a number of respects 
contemporary trends identified earlier in this paper. 
The gains associated with that earlier revolution were 
however subject to a rapid, and largely unanticipated, 
reversal following a ‘punitive turn’, and a corresponding 
shift towards early formal intervention, that occurred 
in the early part of the following decade.3 The origins of 
that turn pre-dated the murder of two year old James 
Bulger, by two 10 year old boys in 1993, but were 
undoubtedly reinforced, and fuelled by it.
In this context, while the recent reduction in FTEs 
represents significant progress for the treatment of 
children in trouble, it also raises the question of how 
that decline has been achieved. Understanding the 
underlying dynamics of the current contraction of 
the formal youth justice system might facilitate the 
development of safeguards to militate against any 
contemporary U-turn that could otherwise undermine 
recent advances. 
Policing children’s behaviour
It is widely acknowledged that childhood is one of the 
most regulated aspects of human activity and one 
important element of that regulation is policing. (Other 
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the most deprived and high crime neighbourhoods. 
The evaluation of YIPs, while generally positive, was 
a little equivocal on the impact of the programme on 
reoffending. It found that more than half of participants 
with an arrest history were not arrested again in the 
follow up period; however, 70% of children participating 
had no previous arrest history and, of these, almost 
half were arrested in the follow up period.12 Moreover, 
the approach which YIPs embodied has been criticised 
for mirroring the risk factor paradigm that underpins 
interventions for adjudicated young offenders,13 and 
consequently exposing children to the unintended 
consequences associated with stigmatisation and 
focusing on individual deficits as the cause of youthful 
misbehaviour.14 Moreover, whatever the merits of such 
criticisms, or the impact on individual participants, it 
is clear from the data shown in figure 11 that for the 
first six years of their existence, YIPs had no discernible 
deflationary impact on the total number of children 
arrested. 
It is moreover hard to ignore the fact that the fall 
in arrests coincided with the ending of the sanction 
detection target and the establishment of the FTE 
indicator, suggesting that modifications to practice, 
to accommodate that policy change, had a significant 
impact on the treatment of children who came to 
police attention.    
Youth restorative disposals (YRDs) were piloted in 
eight police force areas between 2008 and 2009 to 
allow police ‘more discretion with a quick and effective 
police through stop and search.9 There are some 
indications of a change of mood in this regard: the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan police, for instance, 
indicated in May 2017 that she was in favour of an 
increased use of stop and search to address the issue of 
knife crime.10
For current purposes, however, it is important to focus 
on the smaller group who are detained at the police 
station since it is apparent that part of the explanation 
for the fall in detected youth offending is that fewer 
children are arrested by the police than hitherto. As 
demonstrated in figure 11, the number of children 
arrested for a notifiable offence rose between 2002/03 
and 2006/07 but began to fall sharply thereafter; from 
351,644 to 88,517 in 2015/2016, a reduction of three 
quarters. This pattern is broadly similar to that for FTEs, 
though at a higher level.11 
But suggesting that a decline in arrests explains the 
reduction in FTEs simply pushes the question back 
one stage since some account of arrest trends is then 
also required. A number of factors might be thought 
relevant here. First, the longer-term reduction in 
children’s criminal activity identified earlier in the paper 
is likely to have contributed to the fall in arrests, but 
it is doubtful that this could account for the extent of 
the decline from 2007/08 onwards. It is true that the 
Youth Justice Board did invest heavily in youth crime 
prevention in the form of highly targeted interventions 
such as Youth Inclusion Programmes (YIPs), established 
in 2000 to engage with the highest risk children in 
Figure 11
Children arrested for notifiable offences: 2002/03 to 2015/16
year








Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board (2015) op cit and Home Office (2015) Police 
Powers and Procedures England and Wales year ending 31 March 2014. London: Home Office 
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in arrests between 2006/07 and 2015/16 are for more 
minor offences that might considered most appropriate 
for community resolution.  
The NAYJ applauds the fact that fewer children are 
subject to arrest but considers that there may be scope 
for further reductions. The 21,372 formal youth justice 
sanctions imposed in 2015/16 was significantly below 
the number of child arrests (88,517). Some of the 
gap between these two figures no doubt reflects the 
greater use of informal measures post-arrest in recent 
years (an issue addressed below), but it also seems 
likely that a considerable number of children continue 
to be arrested where there is insufficient evidence to 
proceed to prosecution or the matter is too minor to 
warrant a formal sanction. The National Police Chiefs’ 
Council’s children’s strategy confirms that other options 
should always be explored before a child enters police 
custody and that children should not be criminalised for 
behaviour that could be dealt with by other means.20
In any event, while the fall in arrests has had a 
significant impact on reducing the number of children 
entering the youth justice system, it is not, in isolation, 
sufficient as a full explanation since the decline in FTEs, 
while contemporaneous with the drop in arrests, has 
been much sharper. In 2015/16, 75% fewer children 
were arrested than in 2007/08. The equivalent 
reduction for FTEs was 84%.
Where a child is arrested, there are also grounds 
for concern as to their treatment while at the police 
station. On 6 July 2017, for instance, the Metropolitan 
Police announced that they intended to roll-out the use 
of spit hoods to all custody suites in London following a 
pilot and that their use would be available for children. 
The Children’s Rights Alliance for England (CRAE) 
pointed out that this decision had been taken without 
public consultation and that no evaluation of the initial 
trial had been published. CRAE described the use of spit 
hoods for children, which doubled across the country 
in the first nine months of 2016, as ‘distressing and 
dangerous’.21 
All children in police custody are entitled to the 
services of an appropriate adult who is not their legal 
adviser and is independent of the police. The role 
is frequently filled by a parent or carer, but where 
these are unable or unwilling to attend, the youth 
offending team has a statutory responsibility to co-
alternative means of dealing with low-level, anti-social 
and nuisance offending’.  Usually delivered by officers 
on the street shortly after the incident, they were 
intended to contain a ‘restorative’ element with both 
the child and his or her ‘victim’ required to agree to the 
proposed course of action. An evaluation conducted for 
the Youth Justice Board found that more than half of 
YRDs were issued for theft and a verbal apology was the 
most frequent outcome. While pilot areas registered 
a contemporaneous fall in the number of formal 
pre-court disposals given to children, the authors 
were wary of attributing that reduction specifically 
to the introduction of YRDs since non-pilot areas also 
experienced substantial declines.15 In retrospect, it 
would appear that equivalent approaches were being 
developed simultaneously outside of pilot areas. Many 
police forces started to use what have become known 
as ‘community resolutions’ (which operate in a similar 
fashion to YRDs) to deal with low-level lawbreaking 
without the need for arrest. 
Relatively little is known about the operation of 
community resolutions. The Youth Justice Board 
defines them as a measure that enables the police to 
deal ‘more proportionately with low-level crime and … 
primarily aimed at first-time offenders where there has 
been an admission of guilt, and where the victim’s views 
have been taken into account’. The same guidance 
suggests that the disposal may be used with or without 
a restorative element. Community resolutions do not 
constitute a formal disposal and do not contribute to 
the figures for detected offending; they are however 
recorded locally and may be disclosed for the purposes 
of an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check.16 
(This potential for disclosure is significant given that 
many children and their families are unlikely to be 
aware of the implications of accepting a community 
resolution.17) 
National statistics on the use of community resolutions 
do not currently distinguish between children and 
adults but, in 2016/17, they accounted for 2.4% of all 
recorded police outcomes.18 One might reasonably 
anticipate that the proportion for children would be 
considerably higher than this global figure, given that 
youth crime is typically of a less serious nature. It 
would also appear that there are significant variations 
in practice at local level, as one might expect given the 
high level of police discretion in decision-making at this 
stage.19 In any event, it is apparent that community 
resolutions account for a significant, and increasing, 
proportion of responses to children who come to police 
attention. 
The rapid growth in such disposals has coincided with 
the sharp fall in child arrests, suggesting that the two 
are related. Further indicative evidence in this regard 
derives from the fact that the largest recorded declines 
The NAYJ applauds the fact that fewer children 
are subject to arrest but considers that there may 
be scope for further reductions. 
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a consequence, many children remain in police custody 
overnight when they should be in local authority 
accommodation. In recognition of the difficulty, the 
Home Office and the Department for Education have 
produced a ‘Concordat on Children in Custody’, which 
restates the legal provisions and commits signatories 
to comply with them. The document was approved 
by the relevant ministers in April 2016 but has never 
been published. (The draft is however available on the 
Howard League’s website.28) The NAYJ takes the view 
that the Concordat should be published as a matter of 
urgency and steps taken to ensure that children do not 
remain in police custody illegally. 
Hidden diversion
The different trends we see for arrests and FTEs 
indicate that further diversionary mechanisms are at 
play once children are arrested. The available evidence 
shows clearly that evolving youth offending team 
practice has been pivotal in increasing the number of 
cases (involving children in police detention) resolved 
without a formal pre-court sanction or prosecution. 
The functions of YOTs, as envisaged by the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, focused exclusively on children 
subject to formal sanctions. Nonetheless, by 2015, 
at least three-quarters of services were delivering 
preventive activities in one form or another;29 of 20 
YOTs visited by the Youth Justice Board in early 2015, 
just one worked exclusively with statutory cases.30
Precisely because it has not been centrally driven in 
the same way that YIPs and other earlier forms of 
prevention were, YOTs involvement in diversionary 
activities has tended to evolve piecemeal in response 
to falling statutory caseloads; contributing locally to 
the FTE target and a more general ‘reinvention’ of 
diversion.31 The Youth Justice Board’s guidance on out 
of court disposals has no doubt helped to legitimate 
youth justice practice that is not tied to a formal 
outcome while being far less prescriptive than that 
which governs statutory interventions. The guidelines 
encourage joint decision-making between the police 
and YOTs and clarify that an informal outcome might 
be appropriate whatever the child’s previous offending 
history.32 The Board has also acknowledged the impact 
of austerity, prompting YOTs to become integrated with 
wider services rather than operating as stand-alone 
partnerships, and encouraging a reconfiguration of 
provision around prevention,33 leading in some areas to 
what has been called ‘post-YOT youth justice’.34
In retrospect, New Labour’s 2008 Youth Crime 
Action Plan can be seen as a major impetus for the 
diversionary shift. As well as establishing the FTE target, 
the plan provided funding for the development of 
ordinate non-familial provision. Appropriate adults 
are central to safeguarding the rights and wellbeing 
of children while at the police station. In recent years, 
however, concerns have been raised as to the extent 
of delay prior to the arrival of the appropriate adult, 
during which period the child is usually left on their 
own locked in a police cell without adult support. In 
2015, for instance, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary 
noted that children waited, on average, five and half 
hours for the appropriate adult to attend.22 Some later 
inspections suggest that the delay in some areas may 
be considerably greater than this figure: the most 
recently published (at the time of writing) inspection of 
custody suites described an average wait time in West 
Midlands for an appropriate adult of 11 hours and 35 
minutes.23 In such circumstances, the entitlement to an 
appropriate adult can sometimes contribute to children 
spending longer in police custody than would otherwise 
be the case. 
The Taylor review expressed concern that children are 
frequently held in police custody for ‘far longer than 
is necessary’.24 At present the maximum periods of 
detention are identical for adults and children: unless 
authorisation is obtained for extended detention, 
suspects must be released or charged within 24 hours. 
Taylor proposes the introduction of a separate limit 
for children of six hours, other than in exceptional 
circumstances, consistent with his view that the 
treatment of children in conflict with the law should 
be distinct from that of adults. The NAYJ considers that 
police stations are unsuitable places to hold children 
and police custody should be used as a last resort, 
where no other suitable options are available, and 
detention should be for the shortest period necessary. 
The Association accordingly welcomes Taylor’s proposal 
which would also, where there are delays in obtaining 
legal representation or an appropriate adult, encourage 
the police to release children to return to the station 
at a pre-arranged time when all parties would be 
ready to proceed expeditiously. Disappointingly, 
the government, in its response to Taylor, makes no 
reference to this recommendation.25 
A further concern relates to overnight detention. 
Despite a clear statutory requirement that children 
who are refused bail by the police after charge should 
be transferred to local authority accommodation 
rather than remain at the police station, it is clear 
that the legislation is rarely complied-with. The NAYJ 
highlighted this failure as an issue requiring attention 
in 2013, noting that a lack of available local authority 
accommodation tended to discourage police requesting 
it,26 but there appears to have been little improvement 
in the interim period. Of 636 cases examined by HM 
Inspectorate of Constabulary involving such children in 
2015, just one had resulted in a confirmed transfer.27 As 
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‘among the minority who did have needs, 
multiple needs were frequently identified, with 
up to nine needs in a single case. Among those 
cases with one or more needs identified, a large 
proportion had mental health needs. … [T]he 
second most common need identified … was 
parental or family conflict’.
A total of 789 children were offered appointments to 
address identified need. Criminal justice outcomes 
were, however, only recorded for 137 cases, making 
it difficult to ascertain the impact of the service on 
effecting diversion.39 One might reasonably assume, 
however, that some of the fall in FTEs might be 
attributed to children being referred to emotional or 
mental health support as an alternative to a criminal 
justice sanction. 
A greater use of such informal responses has been 
facilitated by the introduction, in April 2015, of a 
new government-endorsed outcome that provides 
an additional mechanism whereby the police can 
record a disposal without the imposition of a formal 
sanction. Outcome 20 ‘is for offences where further 
action is taken by another body or agency other than 
the police’.  The outcome is not restricted to children 
but its introduction might be seen in part as a response 
to criticism by the All Party Parliamentary Group for 
Children that the potential for diversion from formal 
sanctions was reduced as a consequence of the limited 
options available to police as to disposal when they 
recorded an offence.40 Figures for the use of Outcome 
20 are not disaggregated by age but it seems intuitively 
likely that triaged cases and children subject to 
diversion as a consequence of mental health concerns 
will feature prominently among those disposed of 
in this manner. In 2016/17, 34,763 offences were 
recorded as having such an outcome, a rise of 75% over 
the previous year. 
Triage and liaison and diversion were promoted at a 
government level, but it is clear that similar provision 
has emerged across England and Wales, albeit with 
local variation. Roger Smith, for instance, describes 
developments in Durham and Hull that both offer 
prevention activities targeted at avoiding formal entry 
to the youth justice system.41 Kelly and Armitage 
similarly provide an overview of non-statutory 
interventions in two unnamed YOTs to support 
informal disposals for low level offending.42 Surrey 
has developed what it refers to as a youth restorative 
intervention, which avoids a formal criminal record 
and is most commonly offered for incidents of theft, 
handling stolen goods and violence.43 Perhaps the best 
known of these diversionary innovations is the Bureau 
model established in Swansea that aims to blend 
‘promising features of previous and contemporary’ 
initiatives with the explicit objective of diverting 
‘triage’ in 69 areas in England.  Although triage schemes 
operate in a variety of ways, the shared purpose is 
to provide the police with a YOT assessment, usually 
accompanied by the offer of a preventive intervention. 
This can, in appropriate circumstances, allow the 
diversion of low level cases away from a formal criminal 
justice sanction and permit the recording of ‘no further 
action’.  An evaluation of the pilot found that most 
schemes focussed on such low level offending dealing 
mainly with children with no antecedent history who 
had typically committed offences such as theft, criminal 
damage or low level assaults.35 While triage areas 
demonstrated a greater reduction in FTEs than the 
national figure (28.5% against 23%), those conducting 
the evaluation were not able definitively to attribute 
that difference to the scheme since the fall in FTEs 
had commenced prior to its introduction. Moreover, 
it seems clear that, as with the YRD, similar initiatives 
were developed in areas that had not received 
dedicated funding for this purpose. The emergence of 
such schemes no doubt accounts for at least part of the 
recorded falls in FTEs outside of formally recognised 
triage locations. 
A separate initiative has encouraged increased diversion 
of particularly vulnerable children from formal youth 
justice intervention. Youth Justice Liaison and Diversion 
Schemes were piloted in six YOT areas from 2008 and 
aimed to provide enhanced support for children who 
come to the attention of the youth justice system with 
mental health and developmental problems, speech 
and communication difficulties, learning disabilities 
and other similar vulnerabilities, by referring them 
to appropriate provision.36 It was intended that 
assessment by staff at the police station and the 
provision of such support would, in appropriate cases, 
function to divert children from criminal sanction. 
An evaluation found that the extent to which such 
diversion was achieved was variable and depended on 
police commitment to the scheme. Nonetheless, while 
the evaluators were not able to provide independent 
verification because of a paucity of data, staff estimates 
suggested that diversion was achieved in around 20% 
of cases referred. Moreover, access to the scheme was 
associated with an ‘improvement in the mental health 
and wellbeing of young people’, particularly in relation 
to self-harm, depression and anxiety.37 
A subsequent evaluation of a national roll-out to all age 
groups of liaison and diversion schemes across 10 trial 
sites established that some services had widened their 
referral criteria for children to include those subject 
to community resolutions or referred by schools or 
children’s services. A total of 3,636 children were seen 
by liaison and diversion staff across the 10 sites during 
2014/15, and, of these, 2,143 (59%) had no needs 
identified.38 However:
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should not in itself be taken as an absolute measure 
of the extent of diversion in a particular area since the 
baseline figures will represent different starting points: 
some of those areas registering a relatively low drop 
in FTEs, in other words, will have had high levels of 
diversion prior to 2007 and vice versa.) Despite such 
geographical variability, the overall impact is evident. 
Moreover a ‘stock-take’ of youth offending teams 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice confirmed 
that ‘YOTs undertaking prevention work had lower FTE 
numbers than those that do not’.45
In spite of clear progress, the lack of consistent 
information is of concern for a number of reasons. 
First, the absence of any systematic aggregation of 
outcomes for children who have been successfully 
diverted though these innovative means represents a 
missed opportunity to gather further evidence of the 
benefits of decriminalisation. Second, the rediscovery 
of diversion appears to encompass a range of different 
practices and underlying rationales. Smith for instance 
identifies several philosophical underpinnings: ‘needs-
based arguments; restorative principles; and the idea 
of minimum intervention’.46  Haines and Case maintain 
that the Swansea Bureau encapsulates an ethos of 
‘inclusion, engagement and participation’.47 Kelly and 
Armitage, conversely, discern residues of the influence 
of risk management and early interventionism 
embedded in the new practices so that: ‘it is not 
possible to understand current trends as simply the 
rebirth’48 of the ‘progressive minimalism’ of the 1980s.49 
This assessment is largely confirmed by Coyle’s study in 
children from the formal youth justice system and from 
further offending.44  
Where diversion is successfully achieved, outcomes 
from the above interventions are not reflected in the 
figures for detected offending, and they accordingly 
provide alternative options to formal youth justice 
disposals for children who might otherwise become 
FTEs, as well as a smaller number who have previously 
received formal sanctions. As noted above, there is 
little consistent, national information available on 
the extent or nature of diversionary practice - or on 
the number of children receiving services through 
such mechanisms. However, there can be no doubt 
that the availability of diversion-focused prevention 
provision varies considerably between areas and that 
the underlying philosophy of such initiatives and their 
effectiveness is equally variable. (It is also impossible 
to ascertain whether informal outcomes are always 
used to divert children from formal criminalisation 
or whether their development allows for an element 
of net-widening, where community resolutions and 
other equivalent interventions are given to children 
who might otherwise have had no action taken against 
them.)  Such variability is likely to explain at least a part 
of the geographic differences in the trend data for FTEs. 
While the level of FTEs fell across all YOTs between 
2007/08 and 2015/16 by almost 82%, the magnitude of 
the decline ranged from almost 95% in Monmouthshire 
to just over 62% in Swindon (as shown in table 7). 
London YOTs, in particular, are overrepresented 
among those with lower reductions. (The fall in FTEs 
YOTs showing a percentage fall  
greater than 90%
YOTs showing a percentage fall  
of less than 70%
YOT Fall in FTEs (%) YOT Fall in FTEs (%)
Monmouthshire 94.8 Barking and 
Dagenham
69.3
Derbyshire 92.0 Camden 69.0
Surrey 91.6 Northamptonshire 68.8
Ceredigion 91.3 Hounslow 68.8
Pembrokeshire 90.8 Tower Hamlets 68.8
Stockton on Tees 90.7 Telford and Wrekin 68.6
Rutland 90.5 Peterborough 68.5















Source: Derived from 
Ministry of Justice / Youth 
Justice Board (2017) op cit. 
The table excludes the City 
of London and the Isles 
of Scilly, both of which 
recorded just two FTEs in 
2015/16
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‘…without the fullest consideration of whether 
the public interest (and the interests of the 
juvenile concerned) may be better served 
by a course of action which falls short of 
prosecution’.53 
This constituted a consensus that extended from 
government to policy makers, academics and 
practitioners and was manifested by a rise in the 
proportion of children given a police caution with 
the consequence that ‘substantially fewer in number 
were … prosecuted’.54 As a proportion of substantive 
disposals, cautions accounted for less than half in 1980 
but more than three quarters in 1990.55
The allegiance to diversion waned rapidly from the 
early 1990s onwards, as a by-product of the re-
politicisation of youth crime under the ‘punitive turn’. 
Revised guidance discouraged the use of cautions for 
serious offences and noted that multiple cautioning 
could undermine confidence in pre-court disposals.56 
The shift in mood was reflected in falling rates of pre-
court diversion in the first part of the decade and was 
given statutory expression in New Labour’s Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998. The legislation mandated that 
informal action was to be used only in exceptional 
circumstances. The Act also introduced a ‘three 
strikes’ mechanism in the form of reprimands and final 
warnings which replaced police cautioning for those 
below the age of 18 years. Henceforth, prosecution 
would be required on the third offence at the latest, 
irrespective of the circumstances of the child or the 
nature of the behaviour involved. Moreover, where 
a child had a conviction, he or she was not eligible 
for a pre-court disposal in relation to any subsequent 
offending, however minor, even if they had not 
previously had their ‘quota’ of pre-court options. (This 
might occur, for instance, where a child gave a ‘no 
comment’ interview to the police for a first time low 
level offence, rendering them ineligible for reprimand 
or warning.) One commentator has argued in this 
context that ‘New Labour was so bent on intervention 
that … the notion of diversion had been completely 
forgotten’.57 The consequence was an increase in the 
proportion of children needlessly caught up in the court 
process and - in most years of that decade - the actual 
number of prosecutions also rose in spite of the overall 
decline in detected youth offending. 
The rationale presented for change was hardly 
compelling, consisting largely of assertions that 
cautioning did not work and that early intervention 
was necessary if youth crime was not to spiral out 
of control, in spite of evidence to the contrary.58 This 
largely rhetorical justification notwithstanding, the 
legislative change had a real impact, reinforcing rising 
levels of prosecution. As shown in figure 12, between 
1992 and 2002, the rate of diversion for indictable 
two YOT areas which concludes that: 
‘formal and informal forms of diversion were 
interpreted through pre-existing interventionist 
mindsets rather than in relation to the 
diversionary evidence base’.50 
Further clarity on this broad range of potentially 
competing approaches is required to determine the 
extent to which outcomes are influenced by the 
conceptual model adopted. 
Finally, it seems evident that the extent and efficacy 
of preventive work undertaken by YOTs with children 
at the gateway to the justice system to prevent 
criminalisation is not captured in the indicators by 
which the performance of the youth justice system 
is currently measured. As the ‘stocktake’ of YOTs put 
it, ‘there is a discrepancy between what YOTs do and 
what is measured’ by central government.51 A survey 
of YOTs conducted in 2014 confirmed practitioner fears 
that, since much diversionary activity was ‘motivated 
by fiscal pressure rather than an ideological shift away 
from default use of the formal system’, the lack of 
an evidence base for the cost effectiveness of non-
statutory work renders recent advances vulnerable 
to reversal.52 The NAYJ considers this pessimistic 
assessment to be a realistic one. 
Avoiding prosecution
The NAYJ believes that a primary objective of a 
progressive response to children’s offending behaviour 
should be to avoid formal contact with the youth justice 
system;  instead favouring support and assistance from 
mainstream children’s and youth provision where 
necessary. As argued in the previous section, much of 
the current focus on informal diversionary mechanisms 
continues to be a function of criminal justice agencies. 
While such arrangements may not be ideal, they 
nonetheless clearly represent a more child-friendly 
approach than that which characterised youth justice 
until quite recently. 
If decriminalisation is not possible, the Association 
considers that opportunities to divert children from 
prosecution by means of a formal pre-court disposal 
should be maximised. Broadly speaking, the extent 
to which diversion from court is apparent in youth 
justice policy and practice has followed the contours of 
the wider ethos that informs any particular period. A 
commitment to avoid children appearing in court was, 
for instance, a key principle during much of the 1980s. 
Thus Home Office guidance to the police, issued in 
1985, indicated that prosecution of juveniles should not 
be undertaken:
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disposal have been those subject to court proceedings. 
In this context, a reduced use of pre-court outcomes 
is a consequence of increasing diversion outside the 
formal parameters of the system.
In one sense, this pattern is an expected one. Where 
the use of informal responses becomes more prevalent, 
it is inevitable that children in trouble for the first time 
and those committing minor infractions of the law will 
derive the greatest benefit. This is particularly true 
where a focus on reducing FTEs is a significant driver 
of evolving practice. However, an earlier period when 
diversionary impulses were again to the fore provides 
an instructive contrast. During the 1980s, there was 
also a considerable expansion in the use of non-formal 
mechanisms (although as in the present period it is 
difficult to quantify the extent of that growth).60 Yet, 
the rate of diversion did not fall in the former decade, 
suggesting that there was both a decriminalising and 
a diversionary (as in diversion from court) tendency. 
From 2007 onwards, the former has expanded while 
the latter has contracted in proportionate terms. 
The lack of robust data for either period prevents 
any detailed comparative analysis of the extent of 
offending successfully kept outside the formal youth 
justice apparatus. Nonetheless, the difference in 
diversionary trends does raise the prospect that there 
is considerable potential –as yet untapped- for a more 
rapid reduction in present levels of prosecution than 
has so far been achieved. 
One pertinent distinction that might help to explain 
the differential patterns described in the previous 
paragraph is the statutory pre-court framework that 
offences fell from almost three quarters (73%) to just 
over half (54%).59 
The pattern from that date onwards is a little more 
complex. The chart reflects the impact of the sanction 
detection target, which can be seen in the four year 
period from 2002. Large numbers of minor offences, 
that would previously have been dealt with informally, 
were drawn into the formal youth justice process so 
that the use of reprimands and final warnings grew 
more rapidly than convictions, which also rose. The 
increased use of pre-court measures is accordingly 
evidence of net-widening rather than demonstrating 
that children were less likely to be prosecuted. 
Paradoxically, the growth in diversionary measures was 
no longer indicative of a diversionary impetus. 
From 2007, as the focus on sanction detection has 
waned, the chart becomes more difficult to interpret. 
It suggests that there has been a reversion to the 
earlier trend of falling diversion. But whereas during 
the 1990s such a trajectory signalled an increased 
tendency to prosecution, in the more recent period it 
is an artefact of a greater use of informal responses to 
youth offending that are not captured in the official 
data. The dramatic reduction in FTEs during this latter 
period has been achieved, in large part, by dealing 
informally with children who would otherwise have 
received a reprimand, final warning or, more recently, a 
youth caution or youth conditional caution. Convictions 
of children have in other words fallen at a slower rate 
than pre-court disposals, leading to an increase in the 
rate of prosecution. In each year from 2010 onwards, 









Rate of diversion 1992 
to 2014 as percentage of 
all substantive disposals: 
indictable offences 
Source: Derived from respective 
editions of Criminal Statistics and 
Criminal Justice Statistics 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
year
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applied in each period. During the 1980s, the only 
available formal pre-court disposal was the police 
caution, which could be used at any point in criminal 
proceedings if the police determined that it was 
appropriate to do so. From 2000 until 2013, however, 
the final warning scheme remained in place: children 
who entered the formal system between those dates 
were entitled to no more than two disposals before 
prosecution was mandated even for trivial offending.61 
As a consequence, a large number of cases that might, 
during the 1980s, have been deemed suitable for 
caution, could not be considered for a pre-court option.
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012 (LASPO) abolished the strictures of the final 
warning scheme. Warnings and reprimands were 
replaced by youth cautions and youth conditional 
cautions from 8 April 2013 onwards.62 The principal 
distinction between the new provisions and those 
they replaced is that a youth caution can be issued, 
where the police consider it an appropriate outcome, 
irrespective of any previous pre-court disposals or 
convictions. (The legislation does however retain the 
restriction on a court imposing a conditional discharge 
for any further offending within 24 months on a 
child who has received a second youth caution – a 
proscription that did not apply to cautions prior to 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.) Youth conditional 
cautions, which had hitherto been limited to 15 and 16 
year-olds in pilot areas, also became available for all 
children following implementation of LASPO.63 Although 
it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, the slight 
increase in the rate of diversion shown in Figure 11 
during 2013 and 2014 might reflect the impact of these 
statutory changes. Disappointingly the subsequent 
trend does not register any further shift towards a 
greater use of cautioning as an alternative to court 
proceedings. It may be that the focus on FTEs and the 
rigid use of offence gravity scores (which have survived 
the abolition of the final warning regime) in at least 
some areas, continues to discourage a use of formal 
pre-court measures where a decision not to use an 
informal option has been taken. 
The NAYJ welcomes the recent developments towards 
decriminalisation and diversion as being broadly 
consistent with the research evidence and representing 
significant progress towards a more child-friendly 
approach. At the same time, it is concerning that the 
rediscovery of diversion, at the level of policy and 
among some practitioners, appears to be a largely 
pragmatic response to workload and fiscal constraint 
rather than a principled recognition that the youth 
justice system should be used as a mechanism of 
last resort.64 In particular, there has been little or no 
attempt to redirect the capacity to work with children 
in trouble towards mainstream provision. Indeed, 
in 2016, it was estimated that expenditure on youth 
services had shrunk by £387 million over the previous 
six years.65
Ensuring that any savings from increased diversion are 
retained for services to young people is necessary to 
ensure that disadvantaged and vulnerable children who 
are diverted from formal sanctions receive appropriate 
assistance and support in the longer term,66 since, as 
the Centre for Social Justice has pointed out, the youth 
justice system has become ‘a backstop, sweeping up 
the problem cases that other services have failed, or 
been unable, to address’.67 Such extended provision 
is also a practical prerequisite of being able to argue 
convincingly for a substantial rise in the age of criminal 
responsibility. 68 
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 chapter 7  Children in court 
has made no commitment other than to discuss these 
issues ‘with the judiciary and other interested parties’. 
In the meantime, more than 1,000 children each year 
(1,320 in 2016) continue to be tried in a venue that 
most parties consider is ill-adapted to meet their 
needs; extends the time before a decision is reached; 
precludes their effective participation in proceedings; 
while subjecting them to the risk of custodial penalties 
of the same duration as those available for adults.  
Concerns remain however even when children are 
processed in the youth court which, Taylor argues, 
merely provides ‘an essentially modified’ version of 
arrangements that pertain in the adult magistrates’ 
court. He takes the view that youth courts are not 
equipped, and sentencing options too rigid, to deal with 
the complexity of needs that many children in trouble 
present. Courts frequently have little understanding of 
children’s circumstances and magistrates report that 
they rarely know if the disposals they impose have 
been effective. As Taylor puts it:  
‘There is little scope for the courts actively to 
manage a child’s sentence and rehabilitation, 
to reward success or to amend the terms of the 
sentence where the child is not responding, or 
to hold agencies to account for providing the 
necessary support’.5                                                         
As noted in the introduction, as a consequence of such 
observations, the final report of  the youth justice 
review proposed the replacement, for most purposes, 
of the youth court by a system of Children’s Panels; 
a recommendation that is not being pursued by the 
government.   
In one area, however, some progress has been 
made. In the recent period, the standard of legal 
representation available to children, both in the youth 
and the Crown court, has regularly attracted criticism. 
A review commissioned by the Bar Standards Board, 
for instance, found that, despite a patent need for 
child-specific skills, 60% of advocates interviewed 
had not received specialist training (while a further 
11% could not recall whether or not they had had 
such training). Youth court advocacy was relatively 
unpopular: one third of respondents had little 
interest in continuing to undertake such work, largely 
because it attracted low status and reduced levels 
The framework for trial (and 
error)
Where prosecution ensues, the NAYJ considers that the 
trial process should be underpinned by child-friendly 
practice. While considerations of space preclude an 
exhaustive treatment of this issue, it is a matter of 
acute concern that children alleged to have committed 
‘grave crimes’ and those who have adult co-defendants, 
continue to be tried in the Crown Court; a venue 
designed to deal with more serious adult offending, 
where adult sentences become available irrespective of 
the age of the defendant.1
Despite adjustments to accommodate children, the 
Crown Court remains a distinctly inappropriate setting 
for those below the age of 18 years. The arrangements 
that allow children to be tried in adult courts have 
previously attracted criticism from the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child.2 Within the jurisdiction, 
concerns have also been raised by Lord Carlile’s 
parliamentarians’ inquiry report, published in 2014, 
into the operation of courts dealing with children’s 
criminal behaviour. Charlie Taylor, in his review of youth 
justice, similarly observed that:
‘[t]he Crown Court is an intimidating atmosphere 
for children and its processes and physical 
layout are not easily adapted for children. I 
spoke recently to a barrister involved in the trial 
of two girls accused of murder who described 
the atmosphere in the court – which is open to 
the public and reporters – as ‘like a circus’. It is 
difficult to see how, in such circumstances, the 
court can fulfil its statutory duty to promote the 
welfare of the child’.3
Taylor concluded that, wherever possible, children 
should be tried in the youth court and that, in the 
longer term, ‘consideration could be given to trials 
involving children no longer taking place in the Crown 
Court’. The government, in its response, notes the 
concern but adds that removing children from that 
venue would deny children access to jury trial, without 
recognising that a range of commentators have 
previously suggested that, in cases of grave crimes, 
youth court proceedings might be modified to include 
a form of jury.4 As a consequence, the government 
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of remuneration. Moreover, while participants were 
generally confident in their own ability to represent 
children in criminal proceedings, they were less 
complimentary about the standard of services provided 
by their peers, citing a lack of knowledge about youth 
specific legislation; poor communications skills with 
children; limited preparatory work being undertaken; 
and the youth court being used as a training ground 
for less experienced, or less capable, lawyers.6 Similar 
reservations have previously been raised by Lord 
Carlile’s parliamentarians’ inquiry, the Centre for Social 
Justice and, more recently, the Taylor review itself.7 
The latter notes that inadequate representation is the 
inevitable consequences of the fact that a solicitor 
conducting a two-day robbery trial in the youth court 
would be paid approximately one-third of the fee for a 
similar case in the adult magistrates’ or Crown court.8
Such criticisms have prompted some promising 
developments. The Bar Standards Board (BSB) is, at the 
time of writing, consulting on making it mandatory for 
barristers, when applying for a practising certificate, to 
register if they are undertaking, or intend to undertake 
in the following year, work in proceedings involving 
children. The BSB considers that this requirement will 
improve standards of advocacy in youth proceedings 
by making it easier to monitor the extent to which 
barristers registered to engage in such work undertake 
continuing and professional development to maintain 
or develop their specialist competence, and by 
providing transparency as to which barristers are 
registered to do youth work.9 In late 2016, the Solicitors 
Regulatory Authority launched ‘a specialist support 
package for solicitors working in youth courts, to help 
them when representing young people’, although the 
Authority has fallen short of making specialist training 
compulsory for solicitors working in that venue.10 
The NAYJ welcomes these developments as steps in 
the right direction but shares Charlie Taylor’s doubts 
as to the potential of criminal courts, as currently 
constituted, to provide a mechanism capable of 
delivering child-friendly justice. 
Principled sentencing?
In the event that a child is convicted, the NAYJ believes 
that sentences imposed by the court, or delivered by 
youth justice agencies, should be governed by the 
principle of minimum necessary intervention. The 
level of compulsory restriction on the child should 
be proportionate to the seriousness of the offending 
behaviour rather than reflecting assessed risk. 
Supervisory processes and the content of any order 
should be directed to maximising the child’s long term 
potential and wellbeing rather than confined to the 
restrictive, and overtly negative, ambition of attempting 
to avoid particular forms of future illegal behaviour in 
the short term. All court-ordered interventions should 
have the best interests of the child as a primary focus 
and conform to a children’s rights perspective. 
The existing legislative sentencing framework 
for children combines an amalgam of potentially 
incompatible principles that are meant to inform the 
court’s decision-making. These include: the seriousness 
of the offence, taking into account aggravation, 
mitigation and previous offending; the welfare of 
the child; and, potentially most problematically, the 
statutory aim of preventing offending and reoffending, 
introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.11 
No doubt this array of competing considerations 
contributes to the phenomenon of ‘justice by 
geography’, whereby outcomes for offending of a 
similar nature diverge significantly between areas.12 
The NAYJ considers that, in practice, any tensions in 
these principles are frequently resolved through a 
primary focus on punishment. Although not enshrined 
in legislation, courts are also required to take account 
of obligations under international children’s rights 
instruments, and in particular, the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. Too often, such obligations 
receive little attention. 13
In 2017, the Sentencing Council, following extensive 
consultation, published revised guidance on the 
overarching principles for sentencing children, and 
while the constraints of existing statutory arrangements 
inevitably limit the extent to which the guidelines 
mandate a child-friendly response, it nonetheless 
represents a significant advance over the previous 
edition published in 2009.14 It is disappointing, 
however, that the document still allows deterrence as a 
rationale that might legitimately influence sentencing, 
in spite of considerable evidence that children rarely 
consider the consequences when they offend and that 
deterrence is accordingly unlikely to play a significant 
role.15 The NAYJ also has substantial reservations 
about the inclusion of offence specific guidelines for 
robbery and sexual offences, which it considers have 
the potential to undermine individualised sentencing of 
children, a pre-requisite of ensuring that their wellbeing 
is adequately attended to. Conversely, other elements 
of the guideline constitute a considerable improvement 
over that which it replaces. 
There has, for instance, been a shift in terminology with 
the new guideline consistently referring to ‘children’ 
and ‘young people’ as opposed to ‘youth’ and ‘young 
offenders’. (Significantly, this change was made as a 
consequence of the consultation, with the Howard 
League making particularly forceful representations 
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At the point of conviction
The referral order was implemented on a national 
basis from April 2002 as a mandatory disposal 
where a child appears in court for a first offence and 
pleads guilty unless the court imposed an absolute 
discharge, a hospital order or imprisonment. As a 
consequence of the almost automatic requirement 
to impose it in a large number of cases, the disposal 
rapidly established itself as the most frequently-used 
sentencing option. From April 2009, the referral order 
became available for a second offence if the child had 
not been sentenced to one at first conviction; legislative 
change in the same year allowed the imposition of 
a second order in particular circumstances. LASPO 
continued this process of lifting the restrictions on 
the referral order; it remains the primary disposal for 
a first conviction but the court may now also impose 
such an order irrespective of antecedent history or the 
number of previous referral orders, providing the child 
pleads guilty.17 Mirroring this progressive loosening 
of the statutory criteria, the use of the penalty has 
expanded over time: in the year ending March 2016, 
11,970 children were made subject to a referral order 
accounting for 42.9% of all court disposals; equivalent 
to a greater than five percentage point rise over the 
past two years and a rise of more than 10 percentage 
points since 2006, as shown in figure 13. The impact of 
the LASPO changes since 2012/13 are clearly visible in 
the chart.
The referral order has inevitably displaced a range of 
other disposals. This is particularly true for (some) 
on this issue: the draft guideline continued to use the 
old linguistic formulations.16) While such amendments 
are largely symbolic, the NAYJ considers that revised 
terminology has the potential to send a powerful 
message that children should be treated differently to 
adult offenders and should be understood as ‘children 
first’. 
The document also contains a considerable elaboration 
of the factors which the court should take into account 
when considering the child’s welfare. Other welcome 
changes include acknowledgement that: 
• the unnecessary criminalisation of children should 
be avoided; 
• a child’s lack of maturity might reduce  his or her 
culpability and this should be reflected in a reduced 
severity of sentencing;
• children should be given an opportunity to learn 
from their mistakes; 
• BAME children are over-represented in the 
justice system and may have previous experience 
of discrimination, and adverse treatment, by 
authorities; and
• due weight should be given to the impact of care, 
or leaving-care, status, on children’s offending 
behaviour and the potentially different impact of 
any sentence imposed.
The revised guideline came into force from 1 June 2017 
and it is, accordingly, too early to tell whether, and in 
what ways, it will impact on the sentencing of children.
Figure 13 
Referral orders as a 
percentage of all sentences 
imposed on children (for 
summary and indictable 
offences): 2005/06 to 
2015/16 






Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board 
(2017): Key characteristics of admissions to 
youth custody:  April 2014 to March 2016. 
England and Wales. London: Youth Justice 
Board
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which is explained by a rapid, and alarming, escalation 
in the proportion of orders that contain five or more 
requirements: from 2% in 2010/11 to 6% in 2013/14, 
and 11% in 2015/16. While this might, for some cases, 
reflect the use of higher-end community sentencing 
as an alternative to a custodial disposal, thereby 
contributing to the reduction in child imprisonment, it 
may also be an indication that community disposals, in 
at least some instances, are becoming more intrusive. 
The most commonly-used requirement in 2015/16 was 
supervision which accounted for a third of the total, 
suggesting that in many cases, the YRO has become a 
functional replacement for the supervision order. In 
addition, growing numbers of children are subject to 
electronically-monitored curfews whose use has risen 
sharply since 1998, long before the introduction of the 
YRO. During 2015/16, almost 14% — 2,279 in total — of 
all YRO requirements were curfews. The NAYJ considers 
that requiring a child to remain at home during 
particular times, subject to a tag, is rarely an appropriate 
sentence for a child since its primary purpose is 
generally punitive rather than rehabilitative,19 and it 
can frequently operate to the detriment of the child’s 
wellbeing where being within the home environment 
for extended period, without the option to leave, 
may generate safeguarding concerns. The Association 
accordingly regards with disquiet the extension, 
through LASPO, in the maximum duration of a curfew 
requirement from six to 12 months and the maximum 
daily curfew period from 12 to 16 hours.20 No figures 
are currently available to ascertain the extent to which 
these increased powers are being used. 
At the other end of the scale, most requirements 
are used infrequently. As shown in table 8 (on the 
following page), eight requirements each constituted 
less than 1% of the total number made. The minimal 
use of intensive fostering is largely a consequence of 
funding being discontinued after piloting of the disposal 
as an alternative to custody. The even lower use of 
mental health treatment requirements is likely to be 
explained by the high statutory threshold for imposing 
such a condition, which includes the court having 
access to a psychiatric report on the basis of which 
it is satisfied that the mental condition of the child is 
such as requires, and may be susceptible, to treatment 
and that arrangements have been, or can be, made 
for the proposed treatment. At the same time, given 
the extensive evidence of the prevalence of mental ill 
health within the youth justice cohort, such a low take-
up of the disposal might be considered disappointing 
and a reflection of the inadequate provision for child 
and adolescent mental health. The most recent report 
from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
on the UK’s compliance with the UN Convention, for 
instance, pointed to a need to ‘rigorously invest in child 
penalties below the community sentence threshold. 
Between 2003/04 and 2015/16, the use of the 
reparation order reduced from 3.2% of all disposals 
to less than half of one percent. By contrast the 
use of discharges (absolute and conditional – the 
published figures no longer distinguish between the 
two disposals) has remained relatively constant, at 
around 15%. An amendment in LASPO allowed courts 
to impose a conditional discharge as an alternative to 
a referral order for a first offence where they consider 
it appropriate to do so. (Courts were already able to 
make an absolute discharge in such circumstances.)  
However, and in the view of the NAYJ disappointingly, 
this legislative change does not, as yet, appear to have 
had a significant impact on sentencing practice by 
increasing the court’s use of discharges.  
The most significant displacement effect, in terms 
of overall numbers, has been in the use of financial 
penalties which declined, between 2003/04 and 
2015/16, from 16% of all disposals to 7.4%. The NAYJ 
considers that fines are an inappropriate punishment 
for children (or their parents) who overwhelmingly 
already experience severe economic hardship. 
Nevertheless, since the referral order requires a 
minimum of three and up to 12 months intervention, 
it is of concern that, in a considerable number of 
cases, children are being subjected to higher levels of 
intervention than hitherto which may not always be 
warranted by the offending. 
The referral order and other sentencing options 
referred-to in the previous paragraph are sometimes 
known as ‘first tier disposals’ since they can be imposed 
without the seriousness of the offence having to 
meet a statutory threshold. Community sentences, by 
comparison, can only be made where the offending 
is deemed by the court as being ‘serious enough’ to 
warrant that level of intervention.18 The extensive range 
of then extant community sentences was replaced by 
a single disposal, the youth rehabilitation order (YRO) 
for offences committed after 30 November 2009. In 
making a YRO, the court can, in principle, select from 
a menu of 18 different forms of intervention. Though 
the YRO was ostensibly a significant change, most of 
the requirements were already available in the form 
of other disposals, many of which could be combined. 
Moreover, the new order appears to have had a limited 
impact on the distribution of patterns of sentencing 
over and above that which might be anticipated as a 
consequence of the growth of the use of the referral 
order: in 2015/16, the YRO accounted for one quarter 
of all disposals compared with an equivalent figure of 
30% in the year ending March 2009. 
During 2015/16, 6,958 YROs were imposed: 19% 
contained just one requirement and a further 28% 
contained two. This represents a decline over time 
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and adolescent mental health services’. This assessment 
is confirmed within a youth justice context by a recent 
study of mental health provision available to youth 
offending teams, which concluded that there was:
‘...widespread evidence of the inadequacy of 
existing resources to address the full extent of 
the health needs of these young people. An 
important opportunity is clearly being missed to 
reduce future health and criminal justice costs 
through prevention and early identification and 
intervention with this high risk group’.21
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Electronic Monitoring 2,145 13.1%
Programme 1,230 7.5%
Unpaid Work 747 4.6%
Attendance Centre 445 2.7%




Drug Treatment 53 0.3%
Drug Testing 40 0.2%
Local Authority Residence 16 0.1%
Intoxicating Substance Treatment 12 0.1%
Intensive Fostering 6 >0.0%
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Custodial trends
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires 
that child imprisonment should be used as ‘a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of 
time’ and policy and practice within England and Wales 
has, in recent years, become increasingly aligned with 
that international obligation. Reducing the number 
of children in custody is one of the three high level 
targets, established by the coalition government in 
2010 and retained by the Conservative administrations 
elected in 2015 and 2017, by which youth justice 
performance is measured. The adoption of this 
measure is an important indicator of a shift in political 
tone. One of the manifestations of the ‘punitive turn’ 
was that for more than a decade child incarceration 
expanded rapidly. The more recent period, however, 
has witnessed a considerable reduction in the number 
of children deprived of their liberty, with the fall 
commencing well before formal recognition that it 
should be a youth justice target. As shown in figure 14, 
custodial sentences began to tail off from 2002, but 
the decline accelerated rapidly from 2008 onwards, 
coinciding with the introduction of the FTE target and 
the onset of the financial recession. 
In the year ending March 2016, 1,687 children were 
 chapter 8  Children deprived of their liberty 
sentenced to detention, representing a fall of 9% 
by comparison with the previous 12 months and a 
78% reduction from the highpoint (7,653 custodial 
sentences) in 1999. It should be noted, however, that 
the rate of decline appears to have slowed over the 
past 12 months.
As might be anticipated, the largest reductions have 
been in short term (up to two years) sentences, in 
the form of the detention and training order, which 
accounts for the large bulk of custodial disposals. 
But the use of longer-term detention (penalties of 
more than two years) has also fallen. Orders under 
sections 90 and 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 (for children convicted of murder 
and other grave crimes respectively) and sentences 
for children deemed to be ‘dangerous’ (because they 
pose a significant risk to the public of serious harm)1 
have reduced by more than half, from 569 in 2006/07 
to 265 in 2015/16, a reduction of 53%. However, this 
overall trend masks a slight rise in the use of long term 
sentences in the most recent 12 months period.  
The reduction in sentences of imprisonment was not 
immediately reflected in an equivalent decline in 
the population of children held in the secure estate. 
Indeed, as a consequence of an expansion in custodial 












Number of custodial 
sentences imposed on 
children: 1992-2016 
Note: The figures are not directly 
comparable throughout the whole 
period. Until 2006, they are for full 
calendar years; thereafter, they 
relate to the year ending March 
of the given year. Derived from 
respective editions of Criminal 
Statistics and Youth Justice Annual 
Statistics
NAYJ THE STATE OF YOUTH JUSTICE 2017; AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
48
remands, the number of children incarcerated at any 
one time continued to grow until 2008, as shown in 
figure 15, despite the tailing off in custodial sentences. 
An increase in the average length of custodial episode – 
largely a consequence of a slower decline in long term 
sentences than in DTOs – will also have made a small 
contribution to maintaining the custodial population. 
It should be noted, however, that the shift towards 
longer custodial episodes has continued while the 
secure estate population has dwindled: in 2008/09, the 
average number of days associated with each period of 
detention was 81; in 2015/16, the equivalent figure was 
118. 
As noted above, the use of custodial remands 
remained at a high level for a period while the overall 
decline in custody was already underway. As figure 16 
(opposite) demonstrates, the number of children in 
the secure estate following a refusal of bail was at the 
same level in 2009/10 as it had been in 2003/04. As 
a consequence, the proportion of children deprived 
of their liberty who were on remand began to rise 
as custodial sentencing fell: in 2003/04, remands 
accounted for 21% of those in custody; the equivalent 
figure in 2010/11 was 26%. Once the remand 
population began to contract, however, it did so more 
rapidly than the sentenced population. By 2015/16, the 
proportion of the imprisoned population on remand 
had return to earlier levels accounting for slightly more 
than one fifth of the total (22% in 2015/16)
A number of interlocking factors have no 
doubt contributed to the fall in the use of child 
imprisonment.2 There have been legislative changes 
that constrain courts’ decision making. In respect 
of sentencing, the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008 imposed a new duty on the court that 
requires it, where it imposes a custodial sentence on 
a child, to make a statement that ‘it is of the opinion 
that a sentence consisting of or including a youth 
rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and 
surveillance or fostering cannot be justified for the 
offence’.3  The court must also indicate why it is of that 
opinion that neither of these alternatives to custody is 
appropriate. 
In relation to remands, there have been two relevant 
statutory modifications. A provision in LASPO, 
implemented from December 2012, tightened the 
criteria that had to be satisfied for a remand to the 
secure estate and made available, for the first time, 
non-secure remands to local authority accommodation 
to 17-year-olds, who had previously been treated 
as adults for remand purposes. In addition, from 
April 2013, remand budgets were devolved to local 
authorities who became liable to pay the costs of 
custody for children remanded to the secure estate.4  
While both these measures might have reinforced 











Average under 18 population of the secure estate for children and young people 
Source: Ministry of Justice /Youth Justice Board (2017). Key characteristics of admissions to youth custody:  April 2014 to 
March 2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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a downward trajectory, it is clear that they did not 
trigger it since the remand population had already 
declined considerably in advance of implementation. In 
December 2012, for instance, the remand population 
of the secure estate was 35% below that of 12 months 
previously.5 
Perhaps more significant, in any event, is the context 
in which these statutory provisions were introduced. 
Three points in particular stand out.
• A more tolerant climate to children in trouble was 
facilitated by the de-politicisation of youth crime 
and justice, which was, in turn, encouraged by a 
desire to curb excessive cost.
• The introduction of the FTE target and the 
promotion of decriminalisation, itself a reflection of 
that increased tolerance, led to a sharp reduction 
in court throughput which was reflected in fewer 
children being deprived of their liberty.
• Delaying the point at which children entered 
court ensured that they were less likely to amass 
a criminal history that would make custody 
appear inevitable as a consequence of persistent 
offending.6
It was noted earlier in the paper that there is 
evidence that the reduction in child FTEs has had a 
delayed, positive, impact on the number of young 
adults entering the criminal justice system. It has 
been suggested that the fall in child imprisonment 
might have a similarly beneficial influence through 
an indirect deflationary pressure on the number of 
young adults in custody: the decline in the number of 
children deprived of their liberty would accordingly 
have a ‘knock on’ impact on the older age group.7 The 
suggestion has an intuitive plausibility. It is generally 
acknowledged that custodial sentences are associated 
with increased recidivism and deprivation of liberty is 
thought to disrupt the natural process of maturation 
and the corresponding tendency to ‘grow out of crime’, 
described above. An alternative hypothesis, however, 
would hold that the lower use of imprisonment in the 
youth justice system might simply ‘delay the inevitable’, 
leading to a later spike in levels of incarceration as 
young people make the transition to adulthood. It 
is accordingly important to ascertain what empirical 
support there might be in the available published data 
to support the notion of reduced levels of custody for 
children having a knock on effect at a later stage, or vice 
versa.   
The first point of significance, in this context, is that 
while the detained child population has contracted 
sharply since 2008, there has been no equivalent 
reduction in the overall number of people imprisoned. 
Indeed the latter continued to grow, albeit more slowly 
than previously, by 3% between 2008 and 2014 and has 
subsequently remained relatively stable. It is thus clear 
that developments within youth justice are not simply 
a manifestation of broader shifts in the treatment 
of offenders. The picture in relation to young adults 
is, however, rather different to that which pertains 
to children or the older adult offending population. 
There has been a recent decline in the 18-20 prison 
population, but significantly, it commenced later than 
that for children as demonstrated in figure 17 overleaf 
and was more muted when it came. Between 2008 
and 2016, while the number of detained children fell 
by almost a third, the equivalent reduction for young 
adults was small in comparison – at less than 3%. There 
was, however, a pronounced acceleration from 2010 
onwards: over the next four years, the young adult 
population declined by more than 48% (compared to 
a 67% reduction in the child population).  The delay 
of two years would appear to be consistent with 
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a ‘filtering through’ process: the large majority of 
children deprived of their liberty are within the 16-18 
year old age bracket and would become young adults 
within the relevant time frame.  The more modest fall 
for young adults is also what might be expected if the 
reduction was largely explicable in terms of what was 
happening to the child population since a proportion 
of those who receive a custodial disposal at a later 
age would not in any event have been in trouble 
as children: the fall in child imprisonment will not 
accordingly have a subsequent impact on this group.
Further support for such an explanation derives from 
the fact that, more recently still, the 21-24 prison 
population has also begun to reduce, though at a 
correspondingly slower rate, from 14,005 in June 
2012 to 10,481 in March 2017, a fall of 25%. This too 
is a pattern that might have been predicted from the 
original premise.8
Finally, additional backing for the hypothesis that 
trends in the use of custody for children are driving 
similar – albeit delayed and more muted – reductions 
for older cohorts, might be found in the fact that, for 
all three age groups, the fall in incarceration has been 
greater for females than for males, as shown in table 
9. Such a pattern, would be anticipated if the later 
falls in the 18-20 and 21-24 age ranges of the adult 
custodial population were a ‘knock on’ effect of earlier 
reductions in the child populations, since one would 
also anticipate a demographic follow through. 9
A continuation of current trends in relation to youth 
detention thus has broader ramifications that extend 
beyond the boundaries of the youth justice system. 
But maintaining that progress is, as argued above, 
contingent in large part on sustained reductions in 
the number of children entering the system, which 
in turn relies on the persistence of a more tolerant 
climate. One potential threat to that continuation 
















Source: Ministry of Justice (2017) Offender management statistics quarterly – December 2016. London: 
Ministry of Justice





Under 18 years Male 1,291 806 37.65%
Female 58 31 46.6%
18-20 years Male 6,447 4,242 34.2%
Female 236 115 51.3%
21-24 years Male 12,708 10,121 20.4%
Female 504 343 31.9%
Table 9
Custodial 
population by age 
and gender  
Source: Ministry of Justice 
(2017) Offender management 
statistics bulletin, England and 
Wales October to December 
2016. London: Ministry of 
Justice
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term impact of those cuts has yet to be fully realised. 
The introduction in July 2015 of mandatory custodial 
sentences for children aged 16 and 17 years convicted 
of a second offence of possessing an offensive weapon, 
unless such a penalty would be ‘unjust’, poses another 
threat to recent progress.10 The latter provision is likely 
to generate an increase in the number of children 
prosecuted for weapons offences (a scenario already 
evident in the data on detected youth crime over the 
past year) and encourage a harsher response by the 
courts to children in relation to such matters than 
would hitherto have been anticipated. 
Although it would be precipitate to draw any firm 
conclusions, the rises (mentioned earlier in the paper) 
in the population of the secure estate recorded in April 
to June 2017, the latest months for which data are 
available, may be an early indication that the threats 
outlined in the previous paragraph are beginning to 
bear bitter fruit. As shown in figure 18 the decline 
in the number of children deprived of their liberty 
appears to have stalled over the past year. As indicated 
earlier in the paper, a rise in the use of custody for knife 
crime is likely to have contributed to this development. 
The rise over the same period in the use of long term 
detention (again noted above) might also be seen 
as significant. It may be that philosophical clarity 
and further committed action is required if further 
reductions in child imprisonment are to be achieved. 
Whatever the future holds, while the NAYJ naturally 
celebrates the considerable recent advances that 
have been made in keeping children out of prison, 
the Association continues to believe that child 
imprisonment in England and Wales remains too 
high and that incarceration is still not being used 
as a measure of last resort as required by the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. A further 
comparison with the 1980s is instructive in this 
regard. During that decade, not only did the number 
of children consigned to custodial facilities fall, but so 
too did the rate of imprisonment as a proportion of all 
convictions.11 By contrast, in the present period, the 
rate of custody has remained fairly constant: it was 
6.1% in 2007/08, exactly the same as in 2015/16, with 
some modest fluctuation in the intervening years. 
In the year ending March 2016, almost one in three 
children in custody were imprisoned for non-violent 
and non-sexual offending. It seems likely that, in such 
cases, it is the persistence of offending, rather than 
the gravity of the offence itself, which has triggered 
incarceration. Moreover, as the NAYJ has previously 
argued, there is still evidence of high levels of ‘justice 
by geography’: children in some areas have a higher 
likelihood of imprisonment than those in other parts 
of the country, suggesting that further reductions in 
at least some areas are possible.12 The extent of the 
disparities is shown in table 10 (overleaf): rates of 
custody ranged from 2.28 per every 1,000 children in 
the 10-17 general population in Islington, to 0.02 in 
Somerset and 0.00 in Wokingham. While the extent 
and nature of crime varies from one area to another, 
it seems intuitively implausible that such extreme 
variation simply reflects patterns of youth offending 
and suggests that there is considerable scope for 
further reductions in child imprisonment by aligning 
outcomes in areas with a higher use of custody to those 
where deprivation of liberty is low.13
If further progress is to be achieved, and a reversion 
to increased levels of child imprisonment avoided, it is 
imperative that the Conservative government should 
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three key performance indicators for the youth justice 
system. The NAYJ considers that such a target should be 
reinforced by the introduction of additional limitations 
on the powers of the court to imprison a child, further 
tightening the legislative criteria to ensure that less 
serious offences do not meet the custody threshold. 
As the Association has previously maintained, there 
should be a statutory presumption of a community 
based response to children’s offending, combined with 
a legal purpose of custody as being necessary for public 
protection, rather than for purposes of punishment. 
Deprivation of liberty should only be permitted:  
• in cases that involve serious violent or sexual 
offending;
• where the child poses a serious immediate risk of 
harm to the public;
• after non-custodial options have been fully 
explored; and 
• on condition that clear reasons are given in open 
court why such alternatives are not adequate to 
protect the public from serious harm from the child.
Such a threshold would in effect preclude the use of 
imprisonment for less serious, but persistent, offending, 
and for more serious offending unless the child posed a 
continuing risk to the public. Custody for children would 
no longer be a punishment but a genuine last resort.  
The existing statutory provisions in England and Wales 
as they stand also permit sentencing outcomes that, 
in the view of the NAYJ, constitute a clear breach of 
international obligations as a consequence of the 
maximum length of imprisonment available, amounting 
to ‘inhumane’ treatment. Comparative analysis 
reveals the extent to which sentencing provisions 
within the home jurisdiction are out of step with 
normative practice. Amending those provisions to 
align with international norms would further limit the 
child custodial population. Many jurisdictions have 
established an upper limit to child imprisonment: 
three years in Uganda, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru, four 
years in Switzerland, and 10 years for most Eastern 
European counties. Other states impose a custodial cap 
equivalent to a proportion of the maximum sentence 
permissible for an adult. By contrast, in England and 
Wales, where a child is convicted of what is deemed 
a ‘grave crime’, the maximum penalty available is 
identical to the adult term. 
Even more shamefully, perhaps, children can 
be subjected to sentences of life imprisonment; 
indeed where a child is convicted of murder, such a 
punishment is mandatory, despite the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child having recommended 
that states ‘abolish all forms of life imprisonment 
for offences committed by persons under the age of 
18’.  The situation contrasts sharply with that in the 
rest of Europe. Outside of the United Kingdom, just 
two states – France and Cyprus - have legislation that 
provides for life imprisonment of a child. Moreover, 
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East Midlands 0.31 Derby 1.39 Derbyshire 0.10
Eastern 0.26 Peterborough 0.66 Cambridgeshire 0.09
London 0.68 Islington 2.28 Bexley 0.13
North East 0.43 Newcastle 1.05 Northumberland 0.15
North West 0.61 Manchester 1.2 Salford 0.16
South East 0.24 Southampton 0.76 Wokingham 0.00
South West 0.19 Bristol 0.80 Somerset 0.02
Wales 0.39 Newport 1.05 Powys 0.09
West Midlands 0.51 Birmingham 0.94 Warwickshire 0.1
Yorkshire 0.41 Leeds 0.62 East Riding 0.24
England & Wales 0.41
Table 10
Rates of custodial sentencing per 1,000 10-17 population by region and by 
highest and lowest rates of custody in each region: 2015/16 
Source: Derived from Ministry of Justice/ outh Justice Board (2017). Key characteristics of admissions to 
youth custody:  April 2014 to March 2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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in those countries the provisions are rarely used. 
According to Child Rights International Network, just 
two children in France have been sentenced to life in 
the past quarter of a century and there is no record of 
any such sanctions having been imposed in Cyprus.14 
The contrast with England and Wales, where between 
10 and 25 children are given mandatory life sentences 
per annum, could not be more stark.15 The introduction 
of child-specific maxima, and the abolition of life 
imprisonment for offences committed by persons 
below the age of 18 years, would lead to further falls in 
the child custodial population. 
The state of the estate
The urgency of taking action to reduce further the 
number of imprisoned children is emphasised by 
the deterioration in the conditions endured by 
those confined to custodial establishments.16 Almost 
half (46%) of boys in YOIs in 2015/16 reported 
feeling unsafe within the establishment; the highest 
recorded level since the survey began in 2006-08, 
and representing an 18 percentage point rise since 
2011/12.17 This subjective concern of the children 
themselves reflects an underlying objective reality as 
the custodial estate has become an increasingly volatile 
and violent environment: as shown in table 11, relative 
to the number of children incarcerated, the use of 
restraint, levels of assault and the prevalence of self-
harm have all shown alarming rises over the past six 
years. 
Other indicators also show a marked deterioration 
over time. The proportion of boys in YOIs who felt 
safe on the journey to the establishment fell from 82% 
in 2014/15 to 76% in 2015/16. Just 21% of children 
responding in the latter year reported that their cell call 
bell was answered within five minutes by comparison 
with 39% 12 months earlier. The proportion who said 
that they could speak to an advocate had fallen from 
almost half to just over one third. Fifteen percent of 
boys, by comparison with 10% in the previous year, 
indicated that they were too scared or intimidated to 
make a complaint. There had also been a significant 
reduction in the proportion of children in YOIs having 
access to daily association from 67% to 54%. 
The experience of custody also varies according to the 
characteristics of the imprisoned child. If BAME children 
are over-represented in custody, they are also subject 
to less favourable treatment within the secure estate. 
For example, minority ethnic children are less likely to 
think that staff treat them with respect than their white 
peers (58% against 68%) and more likely to consider 
that they have been victimised by staff (39% compared 
to 26%).  This is no doubt reflected in the fact that more 
than half of BAME boys indicate that they have been 
physically restrained by comparison with just over one 
in three white boys.18 Earlier research by the Children’s 
Commissioner for England also established that black 
and mixed-race children are subject to being removed 
from the standard regime, and kept in isolation, at 
three times the rate of their white peers.19
The use of single separation limits the positive work 
that might potentially be done to help prepare children 
for the return to the community. While some reduction 
in the proportionate use of segregation was in evidence 
in the early part of the current decade, the trend has 
more recently reversed: during 2016, there were 52.3 
incidents of isolation each month in custody per 100 
children detained compared with 39 in 2014. During 
Year Number of 
monthly physical 
restraints per 
100 children in 
custody
Number of monthly 
assaults per 100 
children in custody
Number of monthly 
episodes of self-harm 
per 100 children in 
custody
2010 17.6 9.0 5.3
2011 20.5 9.7 4.1
2012 25.1 9.7 5.1
2013 23.8 10.2 5.2
2014 28.4 14.3 6.6
2015 28.2 16.2 7.7
2016 27.8 18.9 8.9
Source: Ministry of Justice/ Youth Justice Board (2015) op cit and Home Office (2015) Police Powers and 
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2016, the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture noted that, at Cookham Wood YOI:
‘High levels of violence were managed primarily 
through locking juveniles up for long periods 
of time, on occasion for up to 23.5 hours per 
day…. [J]uveniles on a normal regime spent on 
average only five hours out of their cells each 
day. The situation was particularly austere for 
those juveniles who were placed on ‘separation’ 
lists (denoted by vivid pink stickers of ‘do not 
unlock’ on their cell doors), who could spend 
up to 23.5 hours a day locked up alone in their 
cells. In the CPT’s view, holding juveniles in such 
conditions amounts to inhuman and degrading 
treatment’.20
The Chief Inspector of Prisons, in his most recent 
annual report, noted that such findings were not 
confined to one institution: within YOIs ‘around a 
third of children [were] locked in their cells on each 
inspection’.21 
One example of this now common practice was drawn 
to the attention of the High Court who, in July 2017, 
determined that Feltham YOI had acted unlawfully in 
keeping a boy in his cell for over 22 hours a day over a 
period of 127 days. The court also declared the failure 
to provide the child with adequate education to be 
in breach of the YOI rules. The latter require that a 
minimum of 15 hours education is provided each week, 
but the child in question received no education during 
his first 55 days at Feltham, and only 15 hours in total in 
a two-month period before the court hearing.22
Perhaps unsurprisingly, such egregious conditions in 
the secure estate are reflected in poor resettlement 
outcomes when children return to their communities. 
As indicated in the next section of the report, levels of 
reoffending associated with imprisonment are worse 
than for any other form of youth justice intervention. 
While a full explanation of this pattern is no doubt 
complex, it is clear that there is a lack of capacity 
within the prison environment to undertake future-
orientated work that aims to prepare the child for 
the transition back into the community. Intervention 
is typically limited by short term concerns to deliver 
what is routinely available within the institution with a 
focus on managing behaviour leading to high levels of 
segregation. The outcomes associated with this failure 
to provide adequate resettlement support, and the 
inability to deliver interventions in accordance with the 
evidence base, have been described as ‘shocking’ by 
HM Inspectorate of Probation.23
The NAYJ supports the abolition of penal custody for 
children: the few who need to be in secure provision, 
because they represent a serious risk to others, should 
be placed in small, child-focused establishments that 
prioritise their wellbeing rather than in prisons and 
similar establishments that exist to make profit. HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons, which inspects YOIs and STCs - 
but not secure children’s homes (SCHs) - reports that by 
February 2017:
‘we had reached the conclusion that there was 
not a single establishment that we inspected 
in England and Wales in which it was safe to 
hold children and young people…. The fact that 
we had reached a position where we could not 
judge any institution to be sufficiently safe was 
bad enough, but the speed of decline has been 
staggering. In 2013–14 we found that nine out of 
12 institutions were graded as reasonably good 
or good for safety.’
Significantly, well over half of recommendations made 
for improvements in YOIs in the previous year’s round 
of inspections had not been achieved.24
In this context, the existing configuration of the secure 
estate leaves much to be desired. At May 2017, 72% 
of incarcerated children were detained in YOIs and 
a further 17% were held in STCs. SCHs by contrast – 
residential child care establishments whose primary 
orientation is care based rather than correctional – 
accommodated just 11% of children deprived of their 
liberty though the youth justice system. 
The decline in the custodial population might have 
provided an opportunity to place a higher proportion 
of those detained in more child-friendly facilities. 
It has instead been accompanied by a reduction in 
the number of places contracted in Secure Childrens 
Homes by the Youth Justice Board, from 225 in 2008 
to 117 in 2017; a fall of 48%.25 This is particularly 
concerning in the light of the findings of a government- 
commissioned independent review Board, with a 
remit to consider the situation in all STCs following 
the disclosure of serious maltreatment of children 
by staff at the Medway secure training centre. The 
Board’s report highlighted that the culture within 
STCs prioritised ‘control and contract compliance over 
rehabilitation’ and that ‘too little emphasis was given 
to safeguarding’. This was contrasted with the ethos in 
SCHs which was characterised as being ‘driven by moral 
purpose’ and focused on creating a ‘nurturing, family 
atmosphere’.26 
Charlie Taylor’s proposal to replace the existing array of 
YOIs and STCs with a network of ‘secure schools’, and 
the government’s commitment to develop two pilot 
establishments in line with that proposal, are described 
above. While few concrete details have emerged as 
to what is envisaged for these new forms of custodial 
institution, it is clear that they will be smaller than YOIs, 
function with a schools-based legislative framework 
and have a focus on education: as Taylor puts it:
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‘Rather than seeking to import education into 
youth prisons, schools must be created for 
detained children which bring together other 
essential services, and in which are then overlaid 
the necessary security arrangements’.27
The NAYJ  welcomes the ambition of the proposal for 
the rapid replacement of YOIs and STCs by alternative 
forms of provision but notes with some unease that 
the proposed size of schools – with a capacity to hold 
60 -80 children28 – is not markedly different from that 
of STCs and significantly larger than even the biggest 
SCH. Research suggests that the size of establishment 
and staff-to-child ratio (in combination with a care-
based ethos) are fundamental to ensuring a child-
friendly provision.29 It should be remembered too, in 
this context, that the defining characteristic of STCs, at 
their inception, was to ensure a focus on education and 
training for younger children deprived of their liberty.30 
History has recorded the failure of that endeavour.
The NAYJ has argued at length elsewhere that an 
emphasis on education falls short of a vision for 
children deprived of their liberty, and that the 
proposals, as currently presented, lack any clearly-
articulated theory of change. The Association has 
suggested that issues of health, wellbeing and 
vulnerability are equally as important as formal 
educational achievement to children’s long term 
healthy development (a proposition that is recognised 
to some extent in Taylor’s review) and has questioned 
the extent to which structural distinctions between 
children deprived of their liberty on grounds of 
offending and those detained in response to welfare 
or mental ill health concerns, are necessarily well 
founded31 and we have to ask therefore why they 
should result in placement in different types of 
institution. Considerations of space preclude a 
detailed rehearsal of those arguments here. For 
current purposes, it is sufficient to reaffirm the 
conclusion that the provision of adequate funding to 
expand and develop SCHs — which at their best, have 
demonstrated that a model based on a child care ethos 
can provide a safe environment with the potential 
to minimise the damage of custody while preparing 
children for a positive future — may be preferable to 
‘reinventing the wheel’.32
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rates of reoffending since children subject to higher-end 
penalties are likely to be those whose offending is more 
serious or persistent. However, analysis by the Ministry 
of Justice suggests that, even when relevant factors 
such as these are controlled for, lower level community 
sentences are associated with significantly better 
reoffending outcomes than high intensity, community-
based disposals. (Recidivism rates are 4% lower for the 
former type of order.) Moreover, children who receive 
custodial sentences of between six and 12 months are 
significantly more likely to reoffend than a comparison 
group sentenced to a high level community penalty 
(again a four percentage point difference).3  
It would accordingly appear that the pattern shown in 
table 12 is not explicable purely in terms of the extent 
to which more serious offending is indicative of a 
potential for lawbreaking, but is also a function of the 
‘criminogenic’ nature of youth justice interventions 
themselves. The evidence would thus appear to 
support an approach to children in trouble that 
maximises diversion from court, promotes a strategy of 
minimum intervention within the court arena, and aims 
at avoiding the use of incarceration, in conformity with 
the principles endorsed by the NAYJ.4 Encouragingly, the 
Taylor review arrives at similar conclusions: 
‘Evidence shows that contact with the criminal 
justice system can have a tainting effect on 
some children and can increase the likelihood 
of reoffending. Wherever possible minor crimes 
 chapter 9  Reoffending as a (dubious) 
measure of effectiveness
Reference has already been made to the fact that 
government policy is focused around three high-level 
indicators by which the performance of the youth 
justice system is assessed. The NAYJ considers that 
that two of these – reducing FTEs and reducing the 
number of children in custody – are eminently sensible; 
they are consistent with child- friendly practice and 
in accordance with the evidence base. The extent to 
which either of those characteristics applies to the third 
target is however questionable. 
The government’s final target involves progressive 
reductions in the rate of recidivism, measured in terms 
of the level of proven reoffending within 12 months 
of youth justice disposal. In the year ending March 
2015, 37.9% of children who received a substantive 
youth justice sanction reoffended within 12 months, 
a substantial increase from 24.6% in 2008 (although 
a marginal reduction over the equivalent figure for 
2014).1 Accordingly, while considerable headway 
has been made against the other two performance 
indicators, progress in relation to the third measure has 
been negative. 
Recidivism varies significantly according to the nature 
of sanction to which young people are subject. As 
shown in table 12, pre-court disposals are associated 
with the lowest level of reoffending while custody 
generates the highest. 
One would anticipate a correlation between disposals 
involving greater restrictions on liberty and increased 
Disposal Percentage reoffending within 12 months
Year to  
March 2008
Year to  
March 2015
Pre-court disposal 24.6% 30.7%
First tier sentence 45.9% 42.3%
Community sentence / YRO 66.2% 64.0%
All custody 74.0% 68.7%
Custodial sentences of six months or under 76.7% 77.2%










Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board. Key characteristics of admissions to youth custody:  April 2014 to March 
2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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should be dealt with outside the formal youth 
justice system, and when a criminal justice 
response is required children should be dealt 
with at the lowest possible tier.’5
Regrettably, the government response appears not to 
have appreciated the import of this finding, arguing 
that the best way to reduce youth crime is ‘clearly 
… to intervene early’. Liaison and diversion services 
are described, in this context, as ‘providing “critical 
information to decision-makers in the justice system, in 
real time, when it comes to charging and sentencing 
these vulnerable people” rather than in terms of their 
diversionary potential [emphasis added]’.6
The NAYJ is, in any event, not convinced that a focus 
on recidivism is a helpful way of approaching work 
with young people in trouble. Indeed there are good 
reasons for supposing that the target does not provide 
a reliable measure of the quality and effectiveness 
of youth justice work and is counterproductive since 
it encourages practice that is not in accord with the 
evidence base.
• Binary measures of reoffending, that simply record 
whether or not children are reconvicted within 
a certain period, provide an exceptionally blunt 
indicator of progress that is unable to capture 
changes in the nature, frequency, or gravity of 
criminal activity.
• Like other official data, figures for reoffending are 
influenced by government targets and changes in 
police practice. One consequence of the successful 
shift towards decriminalisation of large numbers of 
children engaged in low-level lawbreaking is that the 
youth offending population in 2015 is likely to have 
a more entrenched pattern of offending behaviour 
than their peers prior to the introduction of the FTE 
target.7 A rise in rates of reoffending is a predictable 
outcome of this dynamic, since the cohort being 
measured is a very different one to that pre-2008. 
The same logic would lead one to anticipate that 
reoffending following a pre-court disposal would 
demonstrate a more pronounced increase than 
other sanctions, since the reduction in FTEs impacts 
primarily on children who would otherwise receive 
reprimands, warnings and (more recently) cautions. 
This is precisely the pattern shown in table 13.
• If the two targets are indeed in tension, as the 
above suggests, the NAYJ believes that the 
compelling evidence of the negative consequences 
of system-contact, outlined earlier in the paper, 
ought to signal a preference for the FTE indicator 
over measuring trends in recidivism.
• If children naturally tend to grow out of crime, 
the proper role of youth justice intervention, 
within a child-friendly framework, is to give 
them the space to mature and where possible to 
promote mechanisms that support that process 
of maturation. Attempting to influence short-
term recidivism is not obviously relevant to that 
endeavour, since evidence of real behavioural 
change is, in many cases, unlikely to emerge within 
12 months and will take a variety of forms rather 
than simply whether or not the child continues, on 
occasion, to engage in delinquent activity.
• Focusing on the target might be positively harmful: 
it leads to an identification of the child with his 
or her criminal behaviour, which is unhelpful in 
terms of fostering a non-delinquent identity; it 
detracts too from establishing relationships of 
trust between staff and children directed towards 
shared goals; limits the potential for engaging 
children as participants in their own rehabilitation; 
and undermines interventions aimed at supporting 
longer term developmental processes. Yet each 
of these is a marker of effective youth justice 
intervention.8
Such considerations mean that, while the NAYJ is 
content to endorse two of the three current indicators 
for youth justice as being consistent with the evidence-
base and the development of a more child-friendly 
framework for the delivery of services to children who 
offend, the Association views the target to reduce 
reoffending as misplaced. 
Length of custodial sentence Percentage reoffending within 12 months
Year to March 2008 Year to March 2015
6 months or less 76.7% 77.2%
More than 6 but less than 12 months 76.7% 75.4%
More than 12 but less than 48 months 68.5% 57.5%
Table 13
Proven one year 




years ending March 
2008 and 2015
Source: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board (2017). Key characteristics of admissions to youth custody:  
April 2014 to March 2016. England and Wales. London: Youth Justice Board
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It is, however, important to recognise that the data 
shown in table 12 pose something of a challenge for 
the interpretation offered thus far. While levels of 
recidivism for custody are higher than for any other 
disposal, in line with the above argument, overall 
rates of reoffending for imprisonment appear to have 
declined since 2008. One might reasonably have 
anticipated that, during this period, children within 
the custodial cohort would increasingly display more 
entrenched patterns of offending as those committing 
less serious offences, and with a less established 
antecedent history, have been diverted to community 
sentences.  Just as the reduction in FTEs has led to a 
rise in reoffending for pre-court disposals, so too one 
would expect a comparable increase in recidivism for 
children leaving custody. 
Two related factors help to account for why this 
expected outcome has not transpired, neither of which 
implies that custody has become more effective in 
terms of preventing further offending. (The evidence 
in relation to developments within the secure estate, 
outlined above, would in any event render any 
explanation that posits improvements in custodial 
provision exceedingly implausible.) 
First, one of the consequences of the fall in child 
imprisonment is that the average age of those detained 
has risen: in the year ending March 2007, 6.7% of 
children held in the secure estate were aged between 
10-14 years; by April 2016 that proportion had fallen 
to just below 4%. Conversely, over the same period, 
there has been a corresponding rise in the proportion 
of detained children aged 16 or 17 years, from 78% to 
83%. Second, the decline in DTOs has been much more 
rapid than the fall in longer term custodial sentences 
(a reduction of 74% against 53%, respectively, between 
2006/07 and 2015/16). As a consequence, an increasing 
proportion of children are deprived of their liberty 
for lengthy periods. The combined effect of these two 
shifts is such as to entail that children are, on average, 
considerably older at the point of release than they 
were before the fall in the custodial population. 
This is significant when understood in the context that 
children desist from offending as they mature. The 
apparent paradox in the data is thus resolved by the 
fact that those children who are currently deprived of 
their liberty will – by dint of their age – be more likely 
to have begun the process of growing out of crime, 
by the time they leave the secure estate, than the 
custodial cohort of a few years ago. Empirical evidence 
for this account can be derived from two sources. First 
the overall one-year recidivism rate for the year ending 
March 2015 was slightly lower for older children (37.5% 
for those aged 15-17 years) than for younger children 
(39% for those aged 14 years or younger). 
Perhaps more significantly, as indicated in table 13, 
the reduction in recidivism associated with custodial 
penalties is particularly marked in relation to sentences 
of more than one year (indeed reoffending for the 
shortest custodial episodes has increased slightly), 
suggesting an inverse correlation between age at 
release and further offending. This is not to suggest 
that longer periods in custody are beneficial: the 
continued high rates of reoffending following release 
are themselves indicative of the fact that incarceration, 
by comparison with community interventions, is likely 
to impede rather than promote, the natural process of 
desistance.
Abandoning the reoffending target, and replacing 
it with one, or more, alternative measures of 
improvements in children’s longer term wellbeing and 
healthy development, would:  
• Ensure that youth justice performance indicators 
are internally consistent and in accord with lessons 
from research;
• Avoid a narrow focus on negative, short-term, 
legalistic outcomes;
• Help to promote a child-friendly youth justice 
practice that embraces children’s rights, encourages 
participation, engages practitioners’ skills in 
developing relationships and fostering agency, and 
looks to the longer-term wellbeing of vulnerable 
and disadvantaged children as the primary gauge of 
success. 
Such a shift in focus would also help to align more 
closely the outcomes sought for children within 
youth justice to those that pertain in other forms of 
provision for children where the promotion of stability, 
resilience and wellbeing is typically the central focus of 
intervention. 
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The announcement of the Taylor review, in September 
2015, ensured that developments in youth justice 
legislation and policy would, effectively, be put on hold 
for the following two years in anticipation of what that 
review would bring. To those who hoped for radical 
reform, the government’s response to Taylor’s report 
came as a severe disappointment, amounting to a 
missed opportunity. The nine months since the report 
was published have seen few developments, suggesting 
that government commitments to consider further 
some of Taylor’s recommendations may have been 
disingenuous. Progress in relation to piloting secure 
schools has been very slow. 
But if the framework for youth justice remains largely 
unchanged as a consequence of this period of stasis, 
children have inevitably continued to come into 
conflict with the law and criminal justice agencies have 
continued to process them. Analysis of the available 
data confirms that the dominant trends of the past 
decade remain in place – in particular a falling volume 
of detected youth crime and an associated reduction in 
the use of child imprisonment. 
From the perspective of the National Association 
for Youth Justice, the latest balance sheet is largely 
positive. The evidence suggests that the reduction in 
detected youth crime reflects both a genuine fall in 
offending by children and a shift towards a greater 
use of informal responses to youth crime. There has in 
effect been something of a rediscovery of the benefits 
of diverting children wherever possible, manifested 
most strikingly in the target to reduce the number 
of children who enter the system for the first time. 
Success against this measure has been associated 
with fewer children arrested, a much-diminished 
court throughput and a substantially smaller custodial 
population. 
There are, moreover, some early indications that the 
advantages of decriminalisation and decarceration 
are beginning to filter through to an older population, 
providing further empirical confirmation of the premise 
that contact with the youth justice system is frequently 
criminogenic and that left to their own devices most 
children will mature out of crime. 
This ‘good news’ is, however, tempered by some less-
encouraging features of the contemporary youth justice 
landscape. While most types of youth offending have 
fallen, there has been a rise in detected possession 
of knives, and a corresponding increase in the use of 
custodial disposals for such matters. The extent to 
which this trend represents a greater propensity for 
children to carry weapons or a growing policy focus 
on the issue, leading to increased formal reporting of 
such incidents to the police and tougher enforcement, 
is unclear. In either event, the figures are grounds for 
concern. 
The strategic orientation of the police towards children 
in trouble has improved demonstrably in recent years. 
The reduction in the number of children subject 
to arrest is, in part, a manifestation of a growing 
tendency for using informal responses to children’s 
offending where formal sanctions would previously 
have been utilised. While this is clearly preferable 
to criminalisation, a lack of robust data precludes 
adequate monitoring of the extent, nature and 
effectiveness of such measures. Given that the fall in 
FTEs for children from minority ethnic communities has 
been less pronounced than that for white children, the 
discriminatory use of informal responses to youth crime 
cannot be ruled out. It is apparent too that an array of 
inconsistent practices has developed in different areas, 
some of which may encourage net-widening as well as 
diversionary outcomes. 
While fewer children enter police custody, the 
treatment of those in police detention does not 
appear to have improved; children frequently spend 
considerable periods of time without the support of an 
‘appropriate adult’ and those refused bail nearly always 
remain at the police station overnight rather than 
being transferred to local authority accommodation as 
required by the legislation.  
In the court arena, new guidelines on sentencing are a 
marked improvement on those they replace. It is too 
early to tell what difference the revised guidance will 
make to courts’ decision-making but, in the interim, 
the welcome decline in the overall use of detention 
is somewhat marred by an increase in the length 
of custodial episodes and a recent rise in the use 
custodial remands. Worryingly, there are some earlier 
indications that the limits of decarceration, without 
further systemic or philosophical change, may have 
 chapter 10  Concluding remarks
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been reached and that the contraction in the use of 
imprisonment may have stalled. 
At the same time, conditions for children who continue 
to be imprisoned have deteriorated alarmingly; to such 
an extent that the Chief Inspector of Prisons has felt 
compelled to describe the situation as ‘dire’. The NAYJ 
considers that the treatment of those deprived of their 
liberty is entirely unacceptable and that radical action 
is urgently required, most critically to close YOIs and 
STCs.1 In this context, the government’s response to the 
proposals in the Taylor review has, to date, been wholly 
inadequate.  
More generally, the decline in first time entrants, 
court throughput and imprisonment has not benefited 
all children to the same extent. As the youth justice 
system has contracted, the overrepresentation of 
minority ethnic children, in particular black and mixed 
heritage children, has become more pronounced. More 
disturbingly, the extent of overrepresentation rises with 
the level of intervention: almost half of child deprived 
of their liberty come from a minority background. 
Children in care are also more likely than their peers in 
the general population to be criminalised. Inequalities 
are evident too in the treatment of children from 
different backgrounds when they are detained in the 
secure estate. Although disproportionality, in its various 
guises, has received considerable attention in recent 
years, concrete action to address it has been limited 
and progress disappointingly hard to discern. The 
absence of improvement in this regard raises important 
questions as to the ability of the youth justice system to 
provide justice for all children and casts a shadow that 
detracts from the advances made in other areas. 
Finally, it is important not to divorce youth justice 
from broader developments that affect poor and 
disadvantaged children in myriad ways. The rapid shift 
away from a reliance on formal sanctions to address 
children’s troublesome behaviour has led, perhaps 
understandably, to a siphoning-off of resources 
from youth justice services; but these have not been 
deployed to buttress mainstream provision. This is 
particularly concerning given that the capacity of 
mainstream service providers to deliver the personal 
and systematic support that disadvantaged children 
so badly require has simultaneously been gravely 
undermined as a consequence of austerity. Where 
the youth system withdraws intervention – albeit that 
such intervention is delivered through a potentially 
problematic criminal justice lens - and suitable support 
is less available elsewhere, the prospect that youth 
crime will increase as opportunities for young people 
from the most hard-pressed communities diminish, 
cannot be ruled out. 
These wider misgivings are fuelled by, and provide 
confirmation of, a sense that advances within the 
youth justice arena are fragile, and susceptible 
to reversal, because they are largely driven by a 
pragmatic accommodation to changing political and 
fiscal priorities rather than rooted in a principled, and 
evidence based, commitment to achieve the best long 
term outcomes for children in conflict with the law. 
Punitive undercurrents, that might readily provoke a 
sharp, regressive shift, remain discernible within youth 
justice discourse. These are seen most obviously in:
• the lukewarm reception afforded to the Taylor 
review and the endorsement of ‘punishing crime’ as 
a central role for youth justice; 
• the enforcement-focussed reaction to apparent 
rises in knife possession;
• the increasing use of curfews and electronic 
monitoring whose main purpose appears to be 
punitive; and
• a continued adherence to a risk-based model of 
assessment and intervention rather than practice 
embedded in a future-orientated, strengths-
focused, child-centred and young person directed 
understanding of how to address the difficulties 
experienced by children who come to the attention 
of the youth justice system.
Recent history, in the form of the sanction detection 
target, provides concrete evidence of the potential for 
political signals, motivated by a desire to appear tough 
on youth crime, to trigger a rapid escalation in the 
number of children drawn into the justice system and a 
corresponding growth in child imprisonment. The NAYJ 
accordingly believes that consolidating recent progress 
requires the urgent development of a child-friendly, 
rights-compliant, philosophically-coherent and evidence 
informed youth justice policy and practice that eschews 
short term punishment as a rationale for intervention. 
Decriminalisation, diversion and decarceration should 
be promoted on their own merits because of the longer 
term benefits for children’s wellbeing that adherence 
to such principles will deliver, rather than as pragmatic 
mechanisms that make it more likely that politically and 
financially motivated performance indicators will be 
met.
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